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A Matter of Rhetoric: 
The Diversity Rationale in Political Context 
Daniel Ibsen Morales* 
INTRODUCTION 
The scholarly discourse regarding affirmative action in 
higher education has gone awry, becoming shrillr and calcified.2 
The discussion has come to focus excessively on the formal and 
the philosophical aspects of the program (What doctrine properly 
justifies it? Is the program moral?3 Does it go far enough?4), 
while neglecting to consider, in a serious and methodical way, 
how the realpolitik of American race relations might be brought 
to bear on these more "academic" considerations. Instead of ana-
lyzing affirmative action in the shadow of platonic notions of jus-
tice, propriety, or fairness, legal academics should consider what 
race-based remedies are feasible in light of current political lean-
ings, or whether affirmative action in higher education is effec-
tively creating a more integrated workforce. A full consideration 
of the way in which legal reasoning intersects with the political 
dispute surrounding affirmative action would lead scholars to-
wards these more productive paths of inquiry. 
The problem of affirmative action scholarship written in a 
political vacuum has become all the more acute in the wake of 
* Associate, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, J.D. Yale Law School, B.A. Williams College. The 
views expressed herein are solely my own and do not represent the opinions of Kirkland & 
Ellis LLP or its clients. I wish to thank Jacob Corre for his generous feedback; my par-
ents, Ibsen Morales and Haydee Iglesias, for their unflagging support; and, finally, my 
wife, Gwendolyn Baxter Morales, without whose love and encouragement I could not have 
finished this article. 
1 See Lino A. Graglia, Fraud by the Supreme Court: Racial Discrimination by a 
State Institution of Higher Education Upheld on "Diversity" Grounds, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
57, 81 (2004); see also BrianT. Fitzpatrick, The Diversity Lie, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 
385, 397 (2003). 
2 See generally James Boyd White, What's Wrong With Our Talk About Race? On 
History, Particularity, and Affirmative Action, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1927 (2002) (locating the 
problem of racial discourse in a failure to come to terms with history). 
3 See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for 
Affirmative Action and Reparations, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 685, 685 (2004). 
4 See Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You 
Really Want to Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1222, 1224 (1991). 
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former Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's majority opinion in Grut-
ter v. Bollinger,5 the landmark decision that upheld the use of 
race-conscious admission policies at the University of Michigan 
Law School. That decision relied on the so-called "diversity ra-
tionale" for affirmative action, which holds that race-conscious 
admissions programs are constitutionally permissible where an 
educational institution seeks to racially diversify its student body 
for the purpose of ensuring that a variety of viewpoints are rep-
resented in campus discourse.6 Notably, this rationale excludes 
the possibility that a university might implement affirmative ac-
tion programs in order to carry out a vision of social justice that 
seeks to compensate victims of past or current discrimination. 
While the diversity rationale occupies a prominent place in 
extra-legal discourse,? its use as a basis for authorizing affirma-
tive action is heavily disfavored in academic circles. Emblemati-
cally, one prominent conservative scholar entitled his terse, anti-
Grutter screed, Fraud by the Supreme Court.B In keeping with 
the hyperbole of the title, the article set out to claim that Grutter 
was, in essence, the first sign of the legal apocalypse; its total 
disregard for the rule of law would, in the author's opinion, cause 
the "entire legal system ... to denigrate into a farce."9 The arti-
cle located Grutter's fraudulence and deviance from traditional 
norms of jurisprudence in its unwillingness to adhere to minimal 
standards of honesty.1o "Honesty," in the author's view, would 
have meant dubbing affirmative action reverse discrimination 
carried out in the name of a faddish social movement. 
In itself, the depth of this reaction on the part of conserva-
tives should not be particularly surprising; they have waged an 
assault against affirmative action for at least the past decade.u 
But the extent to which the conservative opinion on these sub-
jects is widely shared by other academics is quite surprising. M-
ter all, few scholars of any political persuasion would stand by 
the Fraud author's side as he advocates altering the Fourteenth 
Amendment in an effort to reign in judicial "activists."12 Never-
5 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). 
6 Id. at 328-30. 
7 It has become nearly mandatory for major institutions to have committees on race 
and gender which are nearly always referred to as committees on diversity. See, e.g., 
Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Diversity, http://www.kirkland.com/OurFirm/diversity.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2006); Coca-Cola Company, Diversity, http://www2.coca-cola.com/ 
ourcompany/ourdiversity.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2006). 
8 Graglia, supra note 1, at 57. 
9 Id. at 81. 
10 Id. 
11 See Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming 
the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAJ". L. REV. 953 nn.1--3 (1996). 
12 Lino Graglia, Altering 14th Amendment Would Curb Court's Activist Tendencies, 
-
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theless, prominent liberal scholars like Jed Rubenfeld, Sanford 
Levinson, Kim Forde-Mazrui, and Jack Balkin agree that the di-
versity rationale is a rhetorical sham used to justify a program 
whose proper constitutional authority rests on other theories.I3 
Indeed, the scholarly distaste for diversity is so strong that I 
would hazard that the vast majority of American law professors 
believe it to be an illegitimate constitutional basis for affirmative 
action.I4 
This paper locates the source of this surprising consensus in 
the failure of scholars of all political persuasions to consider how 
the discourse of American racial politics restricts the institu-
tional capacity of the Court. This charged atmosphere limits the 
scope and species of remedies that the Court can authorize, and, 
equally important, what rhetorical form such authorization can 
take. The power of racial minorities is so limited that to success-
fully protect these groups, the Court-the only political institu-
tion insulated from politics-must use its expressive power to 
steer the public discourse in ways that work to affirm the tenu-
ous political footholds that racial minorities have managed to 
gain. As this article will show, the affirmative action rationales 
favored by the academy would catalyze political conflict and 
likely lead to affirmative action's repeal, whereas the diversity 
rationale works to minimize such discord. 
This article will prove this thesis by presenting a theory of 
American racial politics that closely reflects the reality of limited 
minority political power, illustrating how other rationales for af-
firmative action conflict fatally with that political reality, and, fi-
nally, reading Grutter in a way that highlights how the decision 
successfully navigates this difficult political terrain. By reading 
Grutter in this way, I will ultimately show that the diversity ra-
tionale is the most effective means of securing the interests of ra-
cial minorities in the face of limited political and economic clout, 
as well as continuing racial prejudice. By taking this particular-
ized tack, however, this paper aims to push scholars to expand 
the definition of legal reasoning to include decisions, like Grutter, 
that require a rhetoric that is more political than classically le-
gal. 
AUSTIN-AMERICAN STATESMAN, July 10, 2005, at Hl. 
!3 See Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 427-28 (1997); 
SANFORD LEVINSON, WRESTLING WITH DIVERSITY 55, 46 (2003) (quoting e-mail from Jack 
Balkin to Sanford Levinson stating that diversity is a code word for claims to past mis-
treatment); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 3, at 750 n.224. 
14 See Kent Greenawalt, The Unresolved Problems of Reverse Discrimination, 67 
CAL. L. REV. 87, 122 (1979) (stating that the author has never met a professional aca-
demic who believes that diversity for education's sake motivates preferential admission). 
190 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 10:187 
I. MAJORITARIAN PROBLEMA TICS: HOW TO SAFEGUARD 
MINORITY RIGHTS WITHIN A DEMOCRATIC CULTURE 
This section begins with a practical question: How can the 
Supreme Court secure minority rights in a culture that conceives 
of democracy in a majoritarian way? In our democratic system 
the legal or philosophical justification for protecting minority 
rights of any kind-criminal, political, religious or racial-will 
always reveal the central anxiety of representational govern-
ment: Where is the proper boundary of the popular will?I5 
Thoughtful consideration of minority rights in a democratic sys-
tem, of course, has a long history; the American founders, for 
their part, were terrified of democracy's tyrannical potential.I6 
Still, in the popular imagination, democracy means populism: 
one person, one vote, never mind the rest. Americans are terribly 
skeptical of those institutions that would thwart their will. It is 
not accidental that our constitutional tradition has moved 
teleologically toward more direct democracy; ours is a nation 
suspicious of the "knowing" elite. 
This ardent populism will always remain in tension with a 
Constitution presided over by an unelected court. Elites, those 
usually seeking to restrain the popular will, have sought to jus-
tify the anti-populist role of the Supreme Court by offering ba-
roque theories of judicial review, theories that give learned ex-
pression to what is a uniquely democratic anxiety. Alexander 
Bickel, in his famous treatise on our constitutional government, 
The Least Dangerous Branch,11 dubbed this particular tension 
the "countermajoritarian difficulty." 
In that book, Professor Bickel did manage to find a place for 
the Supreme Court in American democracy, but he left the "diffi-
culty" essentially unresolved, and it continues to be a generative 
tension in constitutional theory. Still seeking resolution, other 
celebrated scholars, especially John Hart Ely,1s have built on 
Professor Bickel's work to the point where a canon of theory now 
defends the Supreme Court's power to protect minority rights. 
As with Bickel, though, Ely's tortured "political process theory" of 
15 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16--19 (1962). 
16 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison); see also Julian 
N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1523-24 (1990). 
17 Bickel, supra note 15, at 16. 
18 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
136 (1980) (presenting a "process" theory of judicial review allowing for the Supreme 
Court to intervene where democracy is dysfunctional). 
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judicial review does not resolve the "difficulty'' at all. Indeed, 
both Ely's and Bickel's work might be best thought of as symp-
toms of the countermajoritarian difficulty, rather than cures. 
Nevertheless, this article presumes that the Supreme Court 
should play a significant role in defending-and even advanc-
ing-minority political gains,19 a role that is especially salient 
where "discrete and insular minorities" are concerned.2o 
We should at this point inject a shot of legal realism into 
what has been a strictly abstract analysis. The countermajori-
tarian difficulty tangibly concerns the Justices of the Supreme 
Court in few cases, as the vast majority of the Court's docket mo-
bilizes the interest of a very narrow constituency. As a result of 
this generally limited interest, the Court does not directly con-
front its countermajoritarian role except in very exceptional 
cases; the proximity of the "difficulty'' to the consciousness of the 
Court is a function of the intensity of the democratic gaze, if you 
will. The more lay interest in the case at bar, the more cognizant 
the justices are of their countermajoritarian role. 
In those rare instances of intense public scrutiny, the Court 
is forced to confront its paradoxical institutional role head-on. As 
the only institution that can adequately safeguard minority 
rights or political gains, it has an implicit duty to do so because, 
unlike elected representatives, the Justices will continue to sit in 
their capacity on the Court even in the face of majority discon-
tent. Even so, this very advantage means that its institutional 
capacity is extremely limited in a representative democracy be-
cause its authority is ever-questionable. The only way that it can 
fend off criticism and maintain its institutional credibility is to 
use its rhetorical or expressive power to persuade the masses. To 
persuade effectively, however, the Court must craft its opinions 
with a public audience in mind. Such a task necessarily requires 
a keen understanding of how the Court's arguments will play out 
in the public sphere. 
This method of persuasion is essential because for all that 
constitutional theorists like Bickel and Ely have accomplished in 
constructing a philosophical backbone to support the counterma-
joritarian role of the court, these theories will only persuade the 
academically inclined. And even among the thoughtful, the pull 
of a simple majoritarian view of democracy is quite strong. As a 
result, the countermajoritarian difficulty is not something that 
19 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting 
that "discrete and insular minorities" might require more judicial protection). 
20 See Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529, 
538 (1997) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAW (1997)). . 
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can be transcended through theory; it will always be a concrete 
locus of dispute. 
Accordingly, the strict-constructionist approach to judicial 
review preys on the populist weaknesses of academic theories 
like Ely's.21 Most destructively for liberals who wish for the court 
to aggressively police majority excesses, the position of the strict 
constructionists is much more readily intelligible to a lay audi-
ence, in part because the theory's principal author, Antonin 
Scalia, explicitly shares the majoritarian ethos.22 
By fixing the Constitution's meaning in a particular histori-
cal moment, strict constructionists avoid, as much as possible, 
the process of adapting constitutional meaning to contemporary 
life. Indeed, strict constructionism does an end-run around the 
countermajoritarian difficulty by constructing the myth that an-
swers to constitutional questions are foreordained. Under strict 
constructionism there is no "difficulty" because the Supreme 
Court is not exercising any real power. The Court's hands are 
tied; it is merely doing the will of the law.23 
The elegance of strict-constructionist jurisprudential phi-
losophy, especially when compared to the complexity of liberal 
theories, is a significant tactical advantage outside the academy. 
In its distilled form, this conservative approach ends up looking 
like common sense: implement the law as written because words 
mean what they say. There is no similarly succinct way to advo-
cate that the Court should intervene where politics deals too 
harshly with a disfavored group. Liberal theories, like Ely's, lose 
nearly all of their persuasive value when reduced to a sound bite, 
the dominant structure of public political discourse. Strict con-
structionism, on the other hand, is even more powerful in that 
truncated form. 
Indeed, Bickel's succinct neologism for the problem of judi-
cial review is itself symptomatic of the larger problem that lib-
eral theories of jurisprudence have in insinuating themselves 
into the public sphere: try having a cocktail party conversation 
with non-lawyers about the "countermajoritarian difficulty." 
In the same way, liberals have a very difficult time convey-
ing to the culture at large the need for substantive, rather than 
merely formal, remedies for racism. The colorblind principles es-
21 See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 853-55 
(1989) (using the contrast between the complexity of the liberal approach and the simplic-
ity of originalism to dismiss the possibility that liberals like Ronald Dworkin could create 
a workable constitutional theory). 
22 See Sunstein, supra note 20, at 530, 533. 
23 See Scalia, supra note 21, at 854; Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of 
Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1184 (1989). 
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paused by conservatives, of course, perfectly reflect the intuitions 
and the policy preferences of the American majority. The com-
mon-man appeal of conservative rhetoric is typified by the con-
servative refrain that affirmative action constitutes "reverse dis-
crimination." Framing affirmative action in those terms is 
designed to tap in to the commonplace notion that "two wrongs 
do not make a right." Never mind that the "wrongs" are rather 
different in scope. 
Such frames are powerful because affirmative action is not 
just another countermajoritarian program. Mfirmative action 
and other programs that implicate race are doubly vexing. Not 
only do they produce the general anti-populist anxiety just dis-
cussed, i.e., the countermajoritarian dilemma, they also throw 
the American narrative-unceasing economic and social pro-
gress, radical equality of opportunity-into crisis by bringing to 
the forefront the race-based inequality that is generally re-
pressed to sustain that myth. 
The visceral quality of visual stimulus makes race24 a par-
ticularly effective way to reveal the American narrative's mytho-
logical character, and, as a result, create a nationwide bout of 
cognitive dissonance.25 How can the United States be a country 
of equals when one can see with her own eyes that people of color 
are so disproportionately poor, uneducated, and jailed? 
The potency of race as the primary signifier of American ine-
quality has been amplified by the proliferation of media that 
bring depictions of disparity to leafy, isolated suburbs where all 
is (seemingly) well. There is nothing contemporary about this 
phenomenon; television also played a crucial role in Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr.'s civil rights strategy. Indeed, one way to concep-
tualize what happened during the civil rights movement is to say 
that the visualization of black oppression through new technol-
ogy created fissures in the American narrative that were so large 
that they had to be closed. In today's media-saturated environ-
ment, where newspaper readership remains in free-fall, Ameri-
cans engage with their world in a way that is increasingly visual, 
rendering race an even more potent signifier than it was in the 
24 Though race is considered largely a social construct, there are, nevertheless, vis-
ual cues that allow race to be a functional basis for racism and racial classification, even if 
these break down upon close inspection. 
25 Psychology's cognitive dissonance theory, which holds that individuals have a 
need for consistency in their thoughts and beliefs, supports this idea. See LEON 
FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (Stanford Univ. Press 1962) (1957); 
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 336 n.77 (1987) (attributing the "development of at-
titudes concerning race" at least partially to "the search for coherence"). 
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1960s.26 
The reader should have little trouble conjuring the latest 
public visualization of American racial disparity; it occurred 
when Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans, Louisiana. When the 
citizens of New Orleans, the vast majority of them poor and 
black, were left behind after the storm, the national discourse 
undertook a discussion of why these people, so visibly distinct 
from the American majority, were left to fend for themselves. 
The social construction of America as a land of equals can only 
exist if each individual blinds herself to the color of the inequal-
ity she sees before her; the public consumption of images from an 
event like Hurricane Katrina makes such willful blindness more 
difficult to sustain, because it conflicts so blatantly with the pre-
dominant myth of American equality. 
These are among the more benign reasons that the adjudica-
tion of racial issues is overdetermined. The resolution of racial 
issues is also fraught because negative racial attitudes, conscious 
and unconscious, persist in American society. These attitudes al-
low people to construct counter-narratives that account for the 
inequality exposed in situations like Hurricane Katrina by blam-
ing the victims for mishandling their own lives.27 Thus, the fact 
that those left behind in New Orleans were predominantly black 
comes to signify the inferiority of people of color, not a collective 
problem for which all Americans must take responsibility. From 
this racist viewpoint, the existence of affirmative action is intol-
erable: why are they, those people society marks as "less than," 
entitled to special dispensation? 
Public discussions about race are charged, then, because 
they are highly disruptive to the public's workaday notions of our 
society, especially racist ones. The abstract colorblindness that 
Americans are socially required to cultivate runs up against what 
citizens see with their own eyes. The Court's role in such cases 
should be to steer the public discourse in a way that alleviates 
this dissonance by mending the national narrative of equality. 
Needless to say, for a court to alleviate such dissonance in a way 
that serves the interest of racial minorities is a delicate process. 
In the specific case of affirmative action in higher education, 
26 See KENNETH L. KARST, LAW'S PROMISE LAW'S EXPRESSION: VISIONS OF POWER IN 
THE POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION 69 (1993) (commenting that "television's 
pervasive reach" is in large part responsible for society's ingrained images of crime that 
"prominently featur[e] the faces of young black men"). 
27 See, for example, Bill O'Reilly's comments regarding Hurricane Katrina: "Many, 
many, many'' hurricane victims who failed to evacuate New Orleans are "drug-
addicted .... thugs." The Radio Factor, (Westwood One radio broadcast Sept. 13, 2005), 
available at http:/lmediamatters.org/items/200509150001 (last visited Sept. 25, 2006). 
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the narrative stakes are higher still for the Court because of the 
unique role that universities now play in the American mythos. 
Today's university is both the architect and the signifier of the 
American meritocracy.2s The public has come to view universi-
ties as the gatekeepers to the American dream, and as social lev-
elers that promise a nation free of permanent, old-world, class 
stratification. A Supreme Court decision that even implicitly 
questions the objectivity or the desirability of this imagined soci-
ety of merit would provoke extreme reactions; so embedded is 
meritocracy in the American sense of self that an attack on it is 
an attack on the country's sense of being. Coupling a suggestion 
of merit's subjectivity, as some scholars have, with an effort to 
justify racial preferences will be still more inflammatory.29 
All this is to say that the task of justifying affirmative action 
in higher education is among the most difficult that a Supreme 
Court can face, not because the program is unworthy or constitu-
tionally unconscionable, but because its adjudication causes a 
painful bout of national self-reflection. The vulnerable state of 
the national psyche in these periods of public discourse requires 
the Court to issue a decision aimed at the public3o that will mend 
and restore the national narrative. The diversity rationale is 
perfectly designed to diffuse this public tension and steer public 
discourse in a way that leaves America's mythical self-image in-
tact, while giving minorities the tiniest amount of race-based 
wealth transfer. 
Thus, the role of the Supreme Court in these cases is not to 
explicate the "truth" of affirmative action, as the professoriate 
would prefer, but to preserve the program through the judicious 
and politic use of language designed to influence public percep-
tions. Such delicacy is particularly exigent because affirmative 
action is constitutionally permissible, but not constitutionally 
mandated. Because the Court cannot, in this case, legislate the 
policy as a constitutional requirement, it must use its expressive 
28 See James Traub, Ivory Tower Intrigues: The Pseudo-Meritocracy of the Ivy 
League, SLATE, Oct. 24, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2128377/ (reviewing JEROME 
KARABEL, THE CHOSEN: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF ADMISSION AND EXCLUSION AT 
HARVARD, YALE, AND PRINCETON 549 (2005) ("The selection process at elite universities is 
widely understood as the outward symbol, and in many ways the foundation, of our soci-
ety's distribution of opportunities and rewards.")). Jerome Karabel's book argues that 
America's top universities "legitimateD the established order as one that rewards ability 
and hard work over the prerogatives of birth." Id. 
29 It is somewhat surprising that preferences for legacies do not inspire the same de-
gree of animus as preferences based on race. Legacy preferences in particular undermine 
the cherished American myth of the self-made man. Plainly, class-based animus is less 
prevalent than racial animus in the United States, or perhaps legacy is a factor in admis-
sions at so few public colleges that the animus against it is not very widespread. 
30 It is journalists who translate court decisions into a format that the layperson can 
parse. 
r 
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power to shape the public discourse in~ way that allows legisla-
tive permission to stand. In this way, the Court may comply with 
its role to protect discrete and insular minorities. If the legal 
problem is so constructed, the diversity rationale can be seen for 
what it is: an effort to engage the political sphere in order to pro-
tect minority political gains. 
II. JUDICIAL OPINIONS AS RHETORICAL PERFORMANCES 
Judicial opinions are rhetorical performances. The critic who 
essays an assessment of any performance, whether dramatic or judi-
cial, must he aware, among other things, of the particular role as-
signed to the actor, the likely audience for the performance, and the 
effects sought by the performer.31 
As a result of limited minority power, as well as the en-
trenched interests of the majority, the judicial opinion authoriz-
ing affirmative action must be a rhetorical performance par excel-
lence. The Court must deploy its rhetoric in a way that shapes 
the public discourse, and thereby stabilizes (as much as possible) 
the political conflict surrounding the program in a way that bene-
fits minorities. Yet, even as the diversity rationale furthers this 
objective, critics have assailed the rationale, calling it destruc-
tive, pretextual, or dishonest. In part, these critiques result from 
the failure of academics to follow Professor Levinson's advice;32 
the professoriate seldom takes full account of the context in 
which the Supreme Court authors an opinion. Instead, academ-
ics nearly always evaluate the Court's pronouncements as if they, 
academics themselves, were the Justices' primary audience. In-
deed, most constitutional scholarship operates under the fiction 
that the persuasive values of the academy should actually dictate 
the Court's jurisprudence.33 
Cass Sunstein's scholarship is a notable exception to this 
critical solipsism. His book, Legal Reasoning and Political Con-
flict, argues that there is a fundamental distinction between legal 
reasoning, i.e., what judges must do, and the enlightenment-
inspired, exegetical impulse that animates the scholarly mission. 
31 Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion, in LAw's STORIES: 
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 187, 187 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996). 
32 In this author's view, Levinson fails to follow his own advice when he critiques the 
diversity rationale without considering who the audience for Supreme Court affirmative 
action decisions actually is. See LEVINSON, supra note 13, at 55-61. 
33 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAH, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION (1998) (arguing in part that the Court's Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence is incoherent and has become unmoored from the historical understanding of what 
the Fourth Amendment was designed to do, i.e., to protect citizens from unreasonable 
searches and seizures). While erudite and persuasive, the book does not account for the 
possibility that what the author sees as logical faults in Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence, like Miranda warnings, may have practical salutary effects in the real world. 
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Professor Sunstein argues that where courts are faced with con-
flicts that may be resolved on a number of levels, i.e., the phi-
losophical, the moral, the religious or the narrowly legal, they 
should always choose the lowest possible level of resolution and 
seek to reach an accord on that basis. This kind of reasoning is, 
of course, a staple of common-law jurisprudence, but by adding a 
good dose of political theory to those traditions, Sunstein man-
ages to re-christen this method the use of "incompletely theorized 
agreements."34 
A prime example of the damage that courts may do when 
they fail to use incompletely theorized agreements, and seek in-
stead to resolve disputes in the manner of academics, occurred 
twenty years ago in Bowers v. Hardwick,ss the consensual sod-
omy case recently overturned in Lawrence v. Texas.36 
In Bowers, two men were arrested for engaging in consen-
sual sex under a Georgia anti-sodomy statute that generally 
went unenforced. In the majority decision, the Court upheld 
Georgia's right to prohibit consensual sodomy based on the long 
history of its proscription in America and throughout the world. 
The Court put forth this rationale at a time when the gay rights 
movement was suffering a huge setback. The spread of AIDS in 
the early 1980s was widely blamed on homosexuals, a belief that 
only served to further stigmatize the group.37 
Sunstein's view is that Bowers should have been decided in 
the plaintiffs favor, but on the exceedingly narrow grounds that 
the state of Georgia should not be allowed to suddenly enforce a 
long-dormant law.ss In this way, the Court would have stayed 
out of the political debate entirely by promulgating a highly for-
malistic judgment. Instead of taking that minimalist tack, how-
ever, the Court not only ruled against the plaintiffs, it engaged in 
a gratuitously callous analysis that only served to stir the pot of 
political conflict by emphasizing the long-standing religious and 
historical prohibition of same-sex sodomy.s9 By engaging in this 
34 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 35-38 (1996). 
35 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
36 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that states may not criminalize consensual sex be-
tween adults of the same sex). 
37 Cecilia Chung, Welcome to San Francisco Pride Week!, ASIANWEEK.COM, June 22, 
2001, http://www .asianweek.com/200 1_ 06 _22/opinion 1_ voices_prideweek. html (noting 
that the gay and lesbian rights movement began in the 1960s, but suffered a huge setback 
in the 1980s when AIDS was largely blamed on homosexuals). 
38 SUNSTEIN, supra note 34, at 156 ("Realistically speaking, the ban on consensual 
homosexual sodomy is a weapon by which police officers and others harass people on in-
vidious grounds. The existence of unenforced and unenforceable sodomy laws, used for 
purposes of harassment, is objectionable under the due process clause for that reason."). 
39 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-194 (stating that proscriptions against homosexual sod-
omy "have ancient roots"). 
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high-level historical and religious discussion, the Court did dam-
age to the gay rights movement by authorizing the states' prohi-
bition of the plaintiffs conduct on grounds "higher" than the law. 
Reifying such historical and religious theories in the form of a ju-
dicial opinion stoked religious conservatives, who had already 
constructed their anti-homosexual animus on a religious founda-
tion. Moreover, by taking such a strong position on an emerging 
socio-political issue, and then grounding that position in a his-
torical rationale that fell outside of its institutional expertise, the 
Court also ran the risk that the tide would turn against the deci-
sion, and that its understanding of history might have been 
flawed, as, indeed, Lawrence later found. 
Beyond illustrating the dangers of over-zealous judging, 
Bowers also highlights the difficulty judges have in predicting fu-
ture social changes. Presumably, few of the Justices in the Bow-
ers majority could have imagined the extent to which gay Ameri-
cans would become accepted in American society, much less that 
in some states homosexuals would win the right to marry. 
For all its grandstanding, however, Bowers did not change 
the terms of the gay rights debate; it only affirmed the viewpoint 
on one side of the divide. Such an outcome is typical of judicial 
incursions into a broader discourse;4o even on those few occasions 
where Supreme Court opinions do address a wider audience, the 
Court seldom manages to define the terms of the public debate. 
This lack of discursive command should not surprise, though. In 
light of the common-law understanding of a judge's role, as well 
as the judiciary's mandated isolation from politics, judges gener-
ally have a difficult time figuring out how their judgments will 
interact in the world outside the nation's courthouses. Sunstein 
believes that this disadvantage supports his theory of minimalist 
jurisprudence by proving that the task of evaluating the recep-
tion of an audience outside the judiciary is beyond the judicial 
ken.4I In his view, the political discourse should be left, as much 
as possible, to politics.42 
In its most extreme form, then, Sunstein's minimalist theory 
of jurisprudence allows no room for the Court to make any juris-
generative pronouncements, or to take on the role the Court 
properly played in Grutter. Indeed, Sunstein believes that the 
Court in both Bowers and Lawrence exceeded its institutional ca-
40 Even Justice Scalia acknowledges the public eye watching over the Court in cer-
tain cases. See Scalia, supra note 23, at 1178 (emphasizing the importance of drawing 
distinctions in cases that seem similar but end in different results in order to satisfy a 
"sense of justice" in the community). 
41 SUNSTEIN, supra note 34, at 177. 
42 /d. at 7. 
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pacity.43 In his view, the Court should have invalidated the 
Texas anti-sodomy statute in Lawrence without overruling Bow-
ers.44 In this way, the Supreme Court would only reflect substan-
tial changes in social norms, without seeking to further modify 
those norms, or further catalyze the movement that led to the 
initial shift. 
Sunstein's view of Lawrence, however, is overly cautious and 
damaging to those groups that encounter significant societal dis-
crimination or a denial of full individual rights. There is a mid-
dle-ground between the social-obliviousness exemplified by Roe v. 
Wade45 (where the Court's impatience led to a thirty year con-
servative backlash) and the extraordinarily timid casuistry that 
Sunstein advocates. 
In this author's view, Lawrence occupies that terrain. By fol-
lowing the fundamental shift in social attitudes, Lawrence man-
ages to avoid a devastating political backlash.46 Yet, the decision 
still pushes social mores forward by using official language to 
grant dignity to homosexual acts.47 The Lawrence majority could 
only have accomplished this task by disavowing the callous 
rhetoric in Bowers, and replacing it with a narrative affirming 
homosexuals' shared humanity. Further, by formulating deliber-
ately opaque rhetoric that may be used by other courts to expand 
the rights granted in Lawrence, the Court gave state courts a 
powerful tool to further amplify the scope of gay rights. True, 
this move has led to controversy. In the wake of the Massachu-
setts Supreme Court's decision granting gay marriage, in part 
based on Lawrence, many states passed constitutional amend-
ments banning the practice.48 While passage of those amend-
ments is unfortunate, at least states are having meaningful po-
litical discourse about the subject of gay rights. Progress cannot 
occur without controversy. 
43 See Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, De.~uetude, Sexual-
ity, and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27 (2003) (arguing that Bowers and Lawrence 
should have been decided on grounds of desuetude or equal protection, rather than sub-
stantive due process). 
44 ld. at 32. 
45 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
46 Lawrence has created a backlash, but it is nothing compared to what happened in 
Roe. The very fact that those who object to gay marriage have succeeded in passing 
amendments limiting the definition of marriage illustrates the difference; Roe foreclosed 
political debate and change, whereas Lawrence catalyzed it. 
47 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
48 Thomas Roberts & Sean Gibbons, Same-Sex Marriage Bans Winning on State Bal-
lots, CNN.COM, Nov. 3, 2004, http:!/www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/11/02/ 
ballot.samesex.marriage/. However, the states that passed the amendments were so con-
servative that it is unlikely their state courts would have required gay marriage in the 
first place. These amendments merely formalize what was de facto true prior to their 
passage. ld. 
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Indeed, something real must appear to be at stake for 
Americans to engage in serious, difficult political conversation. If 
the Court were to apply Sunstein's judicial minimalism, those 
conversations would remain repressed because a minority group, 
like homosexuals or Mrican-Americans, cannot easily force the 
hand of a majoritarian legislature. It is appropriate that the 
specter of Roe haunts Sunstein's minimalist theory, but Law-
rence is not another Roe. Roe was damaging because it was so to-
talizing that it left no room for public discourse. Lawrence on the 
other hand leaves significant room for debate, while giving the 
polity the incentive to have the debate in the first place. Law-
rence represents, in my view, a cautious, or, if you will, conserva-
tive progressivism that moves social mores forward without an-
nihilating the ties that bind Americans together. 
Lawrence also does not signify the limits of the Court's pro-
ductive discursive political power, because, like Bowers, Law-
rence did not change the terms of the public debate. Lawrence 
may have shaped and catalyzed gay rights discourse, but the pol-
ity still talks about gay rights using the same essential language. 
Lawrence became an occasion to discuss homosexuality gener-
ally-for politicians and advocacy groups on the right to decry 
the so-called "gay agenda," and for those on the left to show their 
solidarity with the gay-rights cause.49 The case did not funda-
mentally alter this dynamic. 
On occasion, though, the Court can reframe an issue in a 
way that actually reformulates American political discourse. 
Justice Powell's concurring (de facto controlling) opinion in Re-
gents of the University of California u. Bakke5o did just that. 
Powell's articulation of the diversity rationale for affirmative ac-
tion altered forever the way that this nation discusses issues of 
race, and indeed, of difference generally. The diversity frame is 
49 See Associated Press, Quotes on Gay Sex Ban Ruling, June 26, 2003, available at 
http:/lwww.sodomylaws.org/lawrenceflawrence.htm. Including quotations such as the fol-
lowing: 
"If the people have no right to regulate sexuality then ultimately the institution of 
marriage is in peril, and with it, the welfare of the coming generations of children." 
Tom Minnery, vice president of public policy at Focus on the Family. 
"Today's Supreme Court decision overturning a Texas law against homosexual 
sodomy is a defeat for public morality and America's families. This ill-conceived decision 
will have serious repercussions upon public health and welfare in Texas and other states 
that still criminalize sodomy." Rev. Louis P. Sheldon, chairman of Traditional Values 
Coalition. 
"This ruling opens the door for new advances toward full equality and should be 
viewed as a challenge to legislators to help pass important legal protections for GLBT 
(gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender) Americans-like employment nondiscrimination 
laws and comprehensive hate crimes legislation." Elizabeth Birch, executive director of 
the Human Rights Campaign. 
so See 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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so pervasive that it is nearly impossible to have a debate about 
affirmative action without discussing diversity, even if only to 
discredit it. This is particularly true because nearly every major 
American institution-businesses, schools, non-profits, law firms, 
the military-frames issues of race, gender, class, affirmative ac-
tion, ad infinitum, as issues of diversity.5I 
What is so brilliant about diversity, and what makes the 
frame so effective, is that it is highly politic. Diversity talks 
about difference in a way that affirms commonality and commu-
nity. Diversity also fits in neatly with the American myth of the 
cultural melting-pot. Most importantly, though, for a glass-half-
full nation, diversity is positive, hopeful, and validating; it man-
ages to convey a sense that we are all different and all the same. 
The term "difference," on the other hand, a plausible linguistic 
substitute for diversity, has only negative cultural connotations. 
Difference lacks any communal connotation; it just emphasizes a 
kind of solitary individualism that is antithetical to the American 
creed: e pluribus unum. 
For all this country's homogeneity, xenophobia, racism, and 
self-segregation, people are taught that our diversity is a posi-
tive, even a constitutive American asset. Indeed, these beliefs, in 
part, facilitate the American process of immigration and integra-
tion. You can be an American and hold on to essential elements 
of your past identity, even as that past gradually recedes. By 
contrast, in Europe, immigrants can never be considered truly 
European. 
As a result, it would be "un-American" to be against diver-
sity: to do so would be inconsistent with a central part of the 
American sense of self, contrary to the American narrative, if you 
will. We frequently see similar rhetorical techniques in political 
debate. Advocates of a certain political position frame that posi-
tion in a way that no one can say that they are against it without 
seemingly betraying widely-held social mores. The classic case 
occurs in the abortion rights context. What American can say 
they are against "choice" or oppose "life"? 
Thus, Justice Powell's diversity rationale is a prominent ex-
ample of a court not just shaping or catalyzing the public dis-
course to serve the interests of minorities, but substantially al-
tering it. Diversity succeeds because it is perfectly adapted to 
thrive in our culture; it renders a difficult and painful national 
discussion about race largely irrelevant. With diversity, affirma-
tive action became something that enhanced an education and 
51 See, e.g., supra note 7; infra note 88 and accompanying text; infra note 137 and 
accompanying text. 
----
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the workplace, not a discussion about the terrible and endless 
debt that white people owed to minorities, especially Mrican-
Americans. 
As Kenneth Karst argues in Law's Promise, Law's Expres-
sion, "[t]he clear subtext of Justice Powell's Bakke opinion was 
that he was out to save affirmative action. He plainly thought 
that 'diversity' admissions would blur the lines of racial division" 
by dismantling the opposition between merit and racial prefer-
ence.52 Diversity, then, is a way to define race as a meritorious 
characteristic that adds something to the educational and social 
experience. In this way, the diversity rationale seeks to persuade 
the white audience that is being asked to bear the "burden" of af-
firmative action that it is, in fact, benefiting from the program. 
In a sense, then, unlike in Lawrence, the Court's aggressive 
reformulation of racial discourse is in fact consistent with the 
normative foundation of Sunstein's minimalist jurisprudence. 
Sunstein advocates a minimalist approach because, normatively, 
he believes the Court should not "crowd out" political discussions 
or foment any political controversy or change; the Court's role is 
to soothe passions. This kind of politically restorative effect is 
something that Grutter's permutation of Powell's diversity ra-
tionale achieves, but without minimalism. Indeed, the results 
could not be achieved through such an approach. Judicial mini-
malism fails when politics are dysfunctional because, in such 
cases, political deliberation cannot proceed on a productive 
course. 
This dysfunction is obvious in the case of racial discourse: 
Speaking openly about any form of compensation for current or 
past race discrimination is not possible in American democracy. 
Racial minorities are too powerless to force the discussion, lack-
ing numbers and financial clout, and the American up-by-your-
bootstraps ethos is antithetical to condoning an overt handout on 
the basis of race. Given that the Court is the only institution 
that can adequately defend minority rights, because of its coun-
termajoritarian role, the Court should involve itself in the politi-
cal sphere in the way that O'Connor did in Grutter. This in-
volvement is particularly crucial given that, unlike in the gay 
rights area, minorities have secured full, formal civil rights. 
Those are the rights that most Americans think of as constituting 
equality. The substantive benefit that affirmative action confers 
is not obviously consistent with that conception of equality; it 
looks like favoritism, not corrective action. 
52 See KARST, supra note 26, at 105. 
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To view the diversity rationale as an uncommon rhetorical 
move that is essential to the effort to safeguard minority political 
gains, one must of course subscribe to the idea that affirmative 
action is a worthwhile policy. Given its well-elaborated pitfalls, 
however, it is hard for academics to see it that way. Indeed, af-
firmative action could only be deemed a policy worth keeping if 
one takes on the perspective of the marginalized. Only from that 
point of view would a program aimed mainly at the most well-off 
within the group be deemed worth maintaining. 
It is an understatement to say that only elite minorities 
benefit from affirmative action. Only 52% of Latinos and 56% of 
black students graduate from high school each year.53 Of these, a 
mere 23% of black students and 20% of Latino students graduate 
with enough preparation to apply to a four-year college. Need-
less to say, white students graduate from high school and attend 
college in much higher numbers.54 
In the face of this stark inequality, the enormous discursive 
energy spent on affirmative action as it applies to higher educa-
tion appears farcical: so much fuss over such a minor attempt at 
historical remediation. Prominent scholars like Richard 
Delgado55 openly question whether all this talk siphons energy 
away from advocacy for more substantive and broad-based reme-
dial measures. From an economic perspective, distributing mi-
nority gains to the relatively privileged within the group is re-
gressive. A more efficient redistributive scheme would utilize 
limited minority political capital in order to help those worst off 
in the group hierarchy, leaving the minority elite to fend for itself 
in the academic marketplace. 
Despite affirmative action's facially regressive effects, how-
ever, a large percentage of minorities favor the program.56 On its 
face, such support might appear to be a simple case of false con-
sciousness. Lower-class blacks and Latinos use the ascendancy 
of elites that look like them as a proxy for evaluating their own 
mobility or success, sustaining a myth of minority advancement, 
even as conditions have, in fact, changed little for blacks and La-
53 See Jay P. Greene & Marcus A. Winters, Public High School Graduation and Col-
lege-Readiness Rates: 1991-2002, at 3 (Manhattan Inst. for Policy Research, Working Pa-
per No. 8, 2005), available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html!ewp_08.htm. 
54 Id. 
55 See Delgado, supra note 4, at 1222. 
56 See ORLANDO PATTERSON, THE ORDEAL OF INTEGRATION: PROGRESS AND 
RESENTMENT IN AMERICA'S "~ACIAL" CRISIS 147-69 (1997) (examining poll data on af-
firmative action programs). 
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tinos since the civil rights movement.57 
But is this really false consciousness? Is there a better rea-
son for most minorities to support affirmative action? If one 
takes a larger view of what the fall of affirmative action would 
signal about the state of minority political power, it is more plau-
sible to argue that minorities are in a better position to advocate 
for further political gains with affirmative action still intact. For 
marginalized minorities who derive political power only by advo-
cating as a unified whole,58 it would be foolish to seek the aboli-
tion of a politically-conferred advantage, even if it is sub-optimal. 
Experience with discrimination, poverty and inequality has dis-
suaded people of color from being optimistic about the possibility 
of garnering more resources in affirmative action's absence. 
From this perspective, going backward-that is, ridding them-
selves of affirmative action-to move forward is unappealing and 
reckless. Giving up affirmative action in order to expose the 
gross inequality of our system would require the sacrifice of 
whatever limited advantage affirmative action conferred, hurting 
real students and citizens in the workforce in the service of the 
improbable possibility that an absence of minorities in higher 
education would inspire more substantive political and social 
change. 
One must also account for the reaction to affirmative action's 
fall by the white majority. Given the prevailing reality of white 
domination, the loss of affirmative action would only serve as fur-
ther evidence of the majority's power. The absence of minorities 
in America's universities would be read as proof of inferiority 
rather than a symptom of a fundamentally damaged system. 
True, minorities might be emboldened by such a defeat to fight 
harder in the political arena, but they might also be merely de-
feated.59 
In short, affirmative action is important for minority inter-
ests because it is the only tangible advantage that racial minori-
ties have wrested from the political system. That Mrican-
Americans, Latinos, and other underrepresented minorities have 
not been able to gain more from politics is an argument for main-
taining affirmative action, not ending it. We should ultimately 
interpret the meagerness of affirmative action as a symptom of 
57 See DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 7-8 (2d ed. 1980). 
58 See CATHY J. COHEN, BOUNDARIES OF BLACKNESS: AIDS M'D THE BREAKDOWN OJ<' 
BLACK POLITICS 10 (1999) (stating that African Americans have traditionally secured po-
litical gains by linking their fates to one another). 
59 See id. at 9 (noting that African Americans' linked fate enables group mobilization 
for important issues, but also that "the majority of African Americans still lack the politi-
cal, economic, and social resources necessary to participate actively in" the political proc-
ess.) 
r 
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how little power blacks, Latinos and other racial minorities actu-
ally have. Given that limited power, the Court is the only insti-
tution that can effectively steer the political discourse in a way 
that allows minorities to retain their foothold in the meritocracy. 
Ill. THE SCHOLARLY CRITIQUE OF DIVERSITY 
As the reader has no doubt gathered, the diversity rationale 
for affirmative action has never found favor among law profes-
sors. It would not be hyperbolic to claim that diversity is so un-
popular in the academy that the infirmity of the reasoning in 
Justice Powell's Bakke6o opinion is one of the few subjects upon 
which the vast majority of constitutional scholars can agree.61 
Indeed, UCLA's Kenneth Karst appears to be the only prominent 
constitutional scholar who actively supports it.62 Of course, de-
spite this consensus, scholars arrive at their disapproval from 
different directions.63 
The critique of the diversity rationale comes in four basic 
flavors. The least troubling comes from the far right. These 
scholars, perhaps most prominently Lino Graglia, believe that 
formal equality is all that the Constitution and the Civil Rights 
Act require and permit.64 From this normative perspective, af-
firmative action is impermissible racial discrimination and the 
diversity rationale is a devious lie that furthers an unconstitu-
tional program.65 
The second group, which includes the vast majority of schol-
ars, consists of liberals who believe in the substantive goal of af-
firmative action, that is, in helping to achieve a more egalitarian 
society, but believe that the diversity rationale is an illegitimate 
or dishonest constitutional basis for the program.66 Critics from 
the mainstream left object to diversity because they find the ra-
tionale intellectually or morally unfulfilling.67 
The third group is headed by Stephen L. Carter, who in his 
book, Confessions of an Affirmative Action Baby,6s expressed his 
60 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978). 
61 See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 13, at 14, 16; Graglia, supra note 1, at 58-59; Pe-
ter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present and Future, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 
34-35 (2002). 
62 Kenneth L. Karst, Justice O'Connor and the Substance of Equal Citizenship, 2003 
SUP. CT. REV. 357, 373-75 (2003). 
63 See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 13, at 445-46; LEVINSON, supra note 13, at 55; 
Graglia, supra note 1, at 58-59; Schuck, supra note 61, at 27. 
64 Graglia, supra note 1, at 57. 
65 ld. 
66 LEVINSON, supra note 13, at 55-56. 
67 Id. 
68 STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991). 
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concern that affirmative action, and the diversity rationale in 
particular, stigmatized all minorities by casting doubt on their 
abilities and implying that there is one monolithic minority per-
spective.69 Justice Thomas is also a prominent, though more ex-
treme, exponent of this view.7o 
The fourth and last group offers the most compelling critique 
of affirmative action, making two related points. The first, most 
prominently made by Richard Delgado, argues that the concep-
tual framework of affirmative action casts underrepresented mi-
norities in the role of beneficiary and scripts whites as patrons. n 
A full implementation of the radical critique of merit72 (the idea 
that the dominant group has constructed the criteria that consti-
tute merit with the express function of maintaining its dominant 
position),73 the argument goes, would lead to affirmative action's 
outcomes without reinforcing prevailing views of white superior-
ity. The second point, mostly insinuated by critical race scholars, 
is that underrepresented minorities should be wary of any pro-
gram, like affirmative action, that works to uphold the funda-
mental structure of power by making minimal redistributive con-
cessions.74 This last critique has plainly Marxist, though not 
necessarily revolutionary, implications. Mfirmative action, in 
this view, is a palliative (or opiate, if you will) that assuages mi-
nority aspirations just enough to prevent oppressed groups from 
pressing for more radical change.75 
Despite the normative differences between these perspec-
tives, however, they have in common the formal belief that the 
law should speak some form of "truth." That is, these scholars 
share the belief that the Court should provide a rationale for or 
against affirmative action that follows logically from underlying 
principles, or formal readings of relevant texts. The possibility 
that such a "logical" argument may not persuade an audience 
69 Id. at 2. 
70 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
71 Delgado, supra note 4, at 1224-25. 
72 See Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal 
Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705 (1990). For example, he states that we can only rank arti-
cles "within a particular genre" and that "(t]he vast majority of recognizable gen-
res ... have a specifically white, ideologically moderate or conservative history .... built 
into their rules." Id. at 754. See also Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: To-
ward a Critique of Normativity in Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 951 (1991). 
73 Richard Delgado, White Interests and Civil Rights Realism: Rodrigo's Bittersweet 
Epiphany, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1207-08 (2003). This is a Foucaultian phenomenon 
where the diffusion of power works to uphold the essential dynamic of domination. The 
radical critique of merit does not suggest that there is a conspiracy to create discrimina-
tory criteria of "merit"; the phenomenon is more insiduous than that because it occurs 
without any conscious coordination. 
74 See Delgado, supra note 4, at 1224. 
75 See id. 
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outside of the academy, or worse, that it may interfere with po-
litical discourse in a way that damages the interest of those 
whom the program is designed to protect, is not within view of 
diversity's critics. As discussed in section I, supra, the politically 
independent academic bias towards the exegetical is difficult to 
overcome. Academics of either political persuasion rarely con-
sider the possibility that the promulgation of what Sunstein calls 
"incompletely theorized agreements"76 is an essential part of 
law's functionality. 
This failure to consider the full context of the Supreme 
Court's institutional role is particularly damaging where affirma-
tive action is concerned because minority legal gains are so tenu-
ous that a mistake in form, a failure to craft a legal rationale that 
effectively persuades the proper audience, will mean a failure in 
substance; the majority will rally against the program and seek 
to repeal it. 77 
A. The Right: Blinded by Colorblindness 
Most of the scholars on the right who oppose affirmative ac-
tion possess a strong and uncritical belief in the ideal of a color-
blind society7s and do not seriously engage the idea that racism 
may be endemic to our "meritocracy,"79 or consider racism a real 
and pervasive phenomenon. Further complicating the perspec-
tive of the right is their general belief in an originalist or strict-
constructionist approach to constitutional interpretation. It is 
inherently difficult for such a theory to make room for the rights 
of racial minorities, because the perpetuation of slavery precipi-
tated a pivotal compromise at the Constitutional Convention. 
For all their foresight and wisdom, the Founders were also men 
of their time who, in order to form a "more perfect" union, agreed 
to overrepresent and subsidize southern states by counting a 
slave as 3/5ths of a person. Instructively, though Justice Scalia, 
76 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 34, at ch. 2. 
77 Unsurprisingly, despite the political sensitivity of Grutter, such mobilization is 
occurring. In Michigan, Jennifer Gratz, the former Gratz plaintiff, has spent the last 
three years working full.time to rally Michigan voters to pass a ballot initiative prohibit-
ing Affirmative Action in Michigan universities. Opponents of the measure emphasized 
that the only reason that they had a chance of preventing its passage is because they had 
spent millions to reframe the issue, emphasizing the negative effects an affirmative action 
ban would have on women and on Michigan's economic competitiveness. This political 
effort to reframe the issue illustrates how important such frames are to safeguarding mi-
nority rights. Without this reframing, passage of the initiative in a state that has a white 
majority would be a fait accompli. See Tamar Lewin, Campaign to End Race Preferences 
Splits Michigan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2006, at Al. 
78 See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," in CRITICAL 
RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 35 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 
2000). 
79 Kennedy, supra note 72, at 709-1 0; Delgado, supra note 72, at 945-46. 
... 
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originalism's most powerful proponent, believes that Brown v. 
Board of EducationBo was rightly decided, he has admitted that 
the decision cannot be squared with his own approach to consti-
tutional interpretation.s1 In itself, this failure strongly suggests 
that it will be difficult for decisions regarding race to follow stan-
dard jurisprudential rules. Yet, as a result of their formal and 
normative commitments, most conservatives do not take argu-
ments that locate an active role for the Court in defense of minor-
ity rights very seriously.s2 
Put more pointedly, conservative scholars are generally un-
troubled by America's persistent racial inequality. This lack of 
concern prevents theses scholars from engaging their jurispru-
dential philosophy with the social reality of racial disparity. As a 
result, many of these scholars feel free to conduct a crusade 
against affirmative action with moral conviction. Implicitly, this 
conviction is driven by empathy for those whites who were 
passed over in the admissions process in order to admit an un-
derrepresented minority applicant. These whites are cast as the 
"innocents" in the right's affirmative action passion-play.s3 The 
devilish villain is the liberal academic establishment that, some 
conservatives argue, continues to support affirmative action only 
to save itself from the embarrassment its members would feel in 
preaching liberal values to a lily-white congregation. From this 
perspective, mere shame, and not a normative commitment to so-
cial justice, is the primary motivating force behind affirmative 
action. 
The diversity rationale gets under the skin of these scholars 
because (to their credit) they understand how effectively the ra-
tionale changes the terms of the affirmative action debate.s4 
Conservatives would prefer not to discuss diversity at all. Their 
arguments against affirmative action would persuade the white 
majority much more readily if they could bypass diversity and 
simply dub affirmative action race-based discrimination, where 
80 349 u.s. 294 (1955). 
81 Margaret Talbot, Supreme Confidence: The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin 
Scalia, THE NEW YoRKER, Mar. 28, 2005, at 40 (stating that Scalia has admitted that his 
originalist interpretation of the Constitution cannot be squared with Brown v. Board of 
Education). 
82 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 18, at 135 (commenting on the view of some conserva-
tives that "the Court's role in protecting minorities should consist only in removing barri-
ers to their participation in the political process."). 
83 See Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 V AND. L. REV. 297, 298-99 
(1990) (arguing that the diversity rationale paints whites as innocents and therefore 
damages America's racial discourse). 
84 See Graglia, supra note 1, at 57 (discussing the idea that the "diversity" rationale 
for affirmative action has become merely a tool for higher learning institutions to prevent 
embarrassment by admitting minorities). 
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whites suffer in place of people of color. If, alternatively, the pro-
gram were grounded in a history of discrimination, conservative 
scholars could assert the innocence of current generations, mak-
ing the case that whites of today should not pay for the sins of 
their fathers. Many of these scholars are plainly chagrined to 
have to devote their energies to dismantling the diversity ration-
ale, which they consider to be a bald-faced lie.s5 
All of these normative beliefs are well shrouded by this 
group's formal commitments; they position themselves as advo-
cates for neutral principles in a world they perceive to be equal. 
Moreover, these scholars tend to downplay the fact that the Su-
preme Court does not mandate affirmative action; in public 
school settings, at least, the program can be abolished by the leg-
islature or in ballot initiatives.s6 Indeed, some liberal scholars 
argue that the Court's scrutiny of affirmative action is inappro-
priate because the program is already subject to democratic safe-
guards. Conservatives may shy away from this discussion be-
cause the diversity rationale makes legislative advocacy much 
more difficult for conservatives. Lobbying is tougher when lib-
eral opponents can say that legislators who abolish affirmative 
action are against diversity. 
Plainly, the normative perspective of this article is far re-
moved from the viewpoint of conservative scholars on racial is-
sues, and this article does not pretend to proselytize to this flock. 
It will, however, illustrate to conservatives how affirmative ac-
tion works to facilitate many of their other strongly-held convic-
tions. Most prominently, affirmative action solidifies the funda-
mental order of American society, an order which continues to 
favor the white elite in nearly every way, and of which nearly all 
of these critics are a part. That stable social order would be most 
disrupted by affirmative action's absence. Contrary to the view 
of some conservatives, affirmative action is less about saving pro-
fessors from the embarrassment of fewer black students than it 
is about giving some substance to the myth of equal opportunities 
for American social advancement. As Justice O'Connor rather 
candidly put it in Grutter, universities and law schools 
represent the training ground for a large number of our Nation's lead-
ers .... 
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of 
the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly 
85 See id. at 80-82. See also Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 397. 
86 See Graglia, supra note 1, at 59-64. Though Graglia concedes that affirmative 
action is constitutionally permissible, he still insists that a plain reading of the Civil 
Rights Act should lead the Court to conclude that any discrimination based on race is im-
permissible by statute. 
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open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. 
All members of our heterogeneous society must have confidence in the 
openness and integrity of the educational institutions that provide 
this training .... Access to legal education (and thus the legal profes-
sion) must be inclusive of talented and qualified individuals of every 
race and ethnicity, so that all members of our heterogeneous society 
may participate in the educational institutions that provide the train-
ing and education necessary to succeed in America.87 
Mfirmative action, quite apart from being a threat to the 
prevailing social order, plays a prominent role in maintaining 
that order's essential structure. The glut of amicus briefs the 
Court received from the American establishmentss defending the 
law school's position is strong evidence of the veracity of these 
assertions. 
If anything, the transparency with which Grutter put forth 
its view that affirmative action is socially stabilizing should spur 
the mainstream left to join critical race scholars in questioning 
whether a program that is so well favored by the establishment is 
something for which progressives should be comfortable advocat-
ing. Indeed, it is a testament to the centrism of the American 
scholarly discourse that conservatives can even make these ar-
guments against racial preferences in the face of evidence that 
such preferences serve establishment interests so very well. 
Conservatives should also consider how damaging and costly 
it is to maintain a society with a permanent underclass. It is 
easy to forget that racial tensions have produced substantial vio-
lence and destruction of property in this country before.B9 In fact, 
affirmative action in the university setting was initiated in order 
to dampen increasing black militancy. Harvard, Yale and 
Princeton only began admitting students of color in significant 
numbers at the historical moment when the black power move-
ment gained traction in the political sphere.9o Blindness to the 
social implications of a formal legal policy, then, can be highly 
disruptive to other normative preferences of conservative schol-
ars, like law and order. 
87 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332-33 (2003) (emphasis added). 
88 See Brief for 65 Leading American Businesses as Amici Curiae Supporting Re-
spondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241 and 02-516), 2003 WL 
399056; Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241 and 02-516) 
2003 WL 1787554. 
89 See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Hernandez v. Texas: Legacies of Justice and Injustice, 
25 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 153, 165 (2005) (discussing the "Zoot Suit" Race Riots); Police 
Make Arrests at Neo-Nazi Rally, MSNBC.COM, Feb. 25, 2006, http://msnbc.msn.com/ 
id/11562166/. 
90 See JEROME KARABEL, THE CHOSEN: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF ADMISSION AND 
EXCLUSION AT HARVARD, YALE, AND PRINCETON 407 (2005). 
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For an example of a multicultural world sans affirmative ac-
tion, conservatives should look to France. The Gauls have taken 
a radically formalistic approach to racial equality. Apart from 
forbidding affirmative action, the French do not even collect gov-
ernment statistics organized by race or ethnicity;91 they take the 
metaphor of blind justice quite literally. Yet the recent riots in 
Paris's cites, Corbusian housing projects outside the city center 
filled with Arab and Mrican immigrants who were granted citi-
zenship but who lacked any real possibility of belonging to 
French society, are forcing French leaders to consider that formal 
equality may be worthless, and even counter-productive, unless it 
facilitates the material advancement of racial minorities and al-
lows them to fully integrate into French society.92 
As a result of the riots, the French are considering imple-
menting an aggressive affirmative action program.93 Acknowl-
edging the power of the visual, just four months after the No-
vember 2005 riots, the French passed the Equal Opportunities 
act, which requires the Conseil Superieur de l'Audiovisuel (CSA), 
France's broadcasting regulatory authority, to ensure the promo-
tion of minorities to on-screen television roles.94 
Moreover, scholars on the right and left who value social 
stability should not seek to devalue or trivialize the power of aes-
thetics. Humans are highly visual creatures,95 and as a result, 
aesthetics can have a substantive effect in stabilizing the power 
structure. In a state with democratic ideals, whose citizens re-
ceive their news mainly through television, people want to see 
those who look like them in positions of power. When people like 
Justice Thomas dismiss affirmative action as aesthetic window 
dressing, they miss the point (or understand it too well).96 Of 
course, the aesthetic power of affirmative action is only positive 
when you believe that the current social order is, fundamentally, 
worth preserving. Whether it is in the interests of minorities to 
91 David Orland, Connerly's Racial Privacy Initiative: The Unhappy French Connec-
tion, VDARE.COM, May 28, 2003, http://www.vdare.com/misc/orland_racial_privacy.htm; 
Thomas J. Sugrue, Burn, Bebe, Burn, DISSENT MAGAZINE, Winter 2006, http://www. 
dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=l50. 
92 John von Heyking, The Riots of Ramadan, JOHN M. ASHBROOK CENTER FOR 
PUBLIC AFFAIRS, November 2005, http://www.ashbrook.org/publicat/guest/05/vonheyking/ 
ramadan.html. 
93 See Associated Press, French Presidential Hopeful Visits U.S., Sept. 9, 2006, 
available at http://www.townhall.com/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ContentGuid=e93fcOaO-
ded4-417e-al6e-5ef9736e002c. 
94 See Jeremy Harding, Color Bind, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., July-Aug. 2006, at 
40, available at http://www.cjr.org/issues/2006/4/harding.asp. 
95 Approximately half of the human brain is dedicated to processing visual stimuli. 
Human Health Research, Vision, http://www.salk.edu/faculty/research/vision.php (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2006). 
96 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 354 n.3 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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continue to participate within these structures of power IS a 
pressing question that is beyond the scope of this article. 
B. The Liberal Mainstream 
The liberal mainstream reluctantly embraces affirmative ac-
tion as a policy but believes that a more "honest" constitutional 
rationale would better validate minority interests by emphasiz-
ing how the legacy of slavery and a history of colonialism and 
xenophobia have damaged underrepresented minorities in a way 
that requires compensation.97 Professor Kim Forde-Mazrui 1s 
typical of these scholars when he writes: 
The pursuit of diversity is not only less effective at remedying past 
discrimination than pursuing the latter goal directly, it may ulti-
mately doom the remedying of past discrimination by creating the il-
lusion that past discrimination has been remedied when it has not.98 
Forde-Mazrui is particularly concerned with the increase in 
recent African and Jamaican immigrants enrolling at elite 
schools like Harvard. This troubles Forde-Mazrui because he 
wants affirmative action to be "just," and in his view justice 
means that scarce compensatory resources should be distributed 
to those who have actually suffered historical injustice perpe-
trated by citizens of the United States.99 From this vantage 
point, recent African immigrants, who are not descended from 
American slaves, are taking away resources that more properly 
belong to others.1oo Or, alternatively, if such immigrants meet 
ordinary admissions criteria, that institutions are counting these 
applicants towards their racial goals and not increasing the pro-
portion of black descendants of American slaves. 
Diversity diminishes the possibility of historical remediation 
in this view because diversity, at least in elite circles, is simply 
code for historical remediation, yet applicants seeking the prefer-
ence are not required to present any proof that they are actually 
descended from slaves.101 Thus, when Harvard reports in bro-
chures and to its trustees that X percent of its students are black, 
elites assume that the admissions office is implementing proper 
remediation measures, when in fact those resources have gone to 
many people that have suffered no past "harm."1o2 
97 See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 3, at 685 (arguing that affirmative action is justifi-
able as a means of making amends for past harm); see also Rubenfeld, supra note 13, at 
471. 
98 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 3, at 750. 
99 Id. at 709-10. 
100 Id. at 744, 749. 
101 See LEVINSON, supra note 13, at 46. 
102 This view is a bit limited in that it ignores the fact of present discrimination, when 
it is clear that such discrimination would apply to recent immigrants as well. Moreover, 
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Jed Rubenfeld criticizes diversity from a different angle. In 
Rubenfeld's view, diversity's "duplicity" attracts unnecessary at-
tention to the policy: 
Pleading diversity of backgrounds merely invites heightened scrutiny 
into the true objectives behind affirmative action. This heightened 
scrutiny would quite properly reveal the existence of a race- or group-
related purpose, rather than a genuine interest in achieving a repre-
sentative diversity of perspectives)03 
Professor Rubenfeld believes that sincere concern for diver-
sity of perspectives would require institutions to give preference 
to neo-Nazi and Christian fundamentalist applicants.I04 
Despite their differences, then, Rubenfeld and Forde-Mazrui 
agree that diversity harms affirmative action because it has a 
distorted relationship to the legitimate philosophical underpin-
nings of what should be a remedial program. They argue that 
this distortion harms the reputation of affirmative action, works 
against the possibility of social justice, and invites unwarranted 
controversy and contentiousness. 
Apart from these rhetorical concerns, most liberal scholars 
also believe that other policies would better compensate under-
represented minorities while avoiding the discriminatory pitfalls 
of affirmative action. For instance, Professor Rubenfeld argues 
forcefully that affirmative action is a constitutionally permissible 
program while confessing that 
[i]f I had to choose, I would probably vote to scrap the entire patch-
work of affirmative action measures in this country in favor of a mas-
sive capital infusion into inner-city day care and educational facili-
ties.I05 
Though Rubenfeld is careful to separate his opinions about 
the formal propriety of affirmative action from the normative 
wisdom of implementing the program, his policy suggestion and 
his distaste for the diversity rationale have their roots in the 
same political misapprehension. 
From an objective viewpoint, Professor Rubenfeld, Professor 
Forde-Mazrui and other liberal academics are correct that af-
nearly all Mricans, whether enslaved or not, were negatively affected by western coloni-
zation and the slave trade. 
103 Rubenfeld, supra note 13, at 471-72. 
104 Id. at 471. Is it really the case that universities cannot legitimately value the per-
spective that minorities carry with them-first hand experience of the effects of a racial-
ized society--over the often reactionary and freely chosen beliefs of Christian Conserva-
tives and Neo-Nazis? In any event, in the case of Christian conservatives applying to 
elite, largely secular universities, strongly-held beliefs are usually plus factors on admis-
sions committees. 
10s Id. 
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firmative action and the diversity rationale are sub-optimal po-
litical outcomes. The program itself does little to ameliorate the 
centuries of discrimination that were so damaging to blacks,I06 it 
raises questions about the performance of racial stereotypes and 
the possibility of stigma, and it may calcify racial identity in a so-
cially undesirable way. Moreover, it is vulnerable to the under-
inclusiveness argument: Why is racial diversity privileged over 
other forms? Worst of all, the program appears to fully satisfy no 
particular constituency because it is compromised on all sides. 
But Forde-Mazrui and Rubenfeld's policy alternatives, each 
of which would require an expensive and sustained national fo-
cus on the plight of blacks and other underrepresented minori-
ties, imply that they have critiqued affirmative action and diver-
sity without having seriously considered what kind of race-based 
remediation programs are politically possible in twenty-first cen-
tury America. This lack of consideration is surprising, as the im-
possibility of implementing a program that fulfills either of these 
professor's utopian suggestions should be quite plain. 
The past twenty-five years of American political history have 
been defined by a growing political consensus, spurred by the 
Republican party, that the central idea of the Great Society-
that government can play an active and positive role in helping 
its citizens-is bankrupt. In accord with this shift, affirmative 
action itself, a program that costs very little, has been under 
siege during the same period. It is highly unlikely that in this 
political climate a white majority would implement a radical pro-
gram designed primarily to aid negatively-racialized minori-
ties.I07 
For a more concrete example of the difficulties more "sub-
stantive" remediation would encounter, consider the suggestion 
that school funding be equalized between racial groups, or at 
106 Professor Rubenfeld argues that helping African-Americans should be the chief 
goal of affirmative action. ld. at 471-72. This perspective is limited and he fails to ap-
preciate the extent to which other minorities, particularly Latinos, also have a long his-
tory of second class status. See Richard Delgado, Locating Latinos in the Field of Civil 
Rights: Assessing the NeoLiberal Case far Radical Exclusion, 83 TEX. L. REV. 489, 491-93 
(2004) (reviewing GEORGE YANCEY, WHO IS WHITE?: LATINOS, ASIANS, AND THE NEW 
BLACKINONBLACK DIVIDE (2003)). 
107 It is true that some political attention has been paid to the plight of inner-city 
schools by the "compassionate conservative" Bush administration, but even that example 
proves my point. No Child Left Behind is a mandate for superior performance without 
any money to fund the remediation that the law requires. Scores have gone up in some 
jurisdictions, but per-pupil funding has not come close to being equalized. And in some 
ways equal isn't even enough. As Forde-Mazrui contends in his article, there are all kinds 
of socializations and day to day interactions that black children lack and white children 
have; to really reach the goal of equality of opportunity would require a "massive infusion 
of resources into poor black communities" for several generations. See Forde-Mazrui, su-
pra note 3, at 749-50. 
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least significantly improved. In the absence of a state or federal 
supreme court decision that mandates equal school funding, in-
dividualistic parents will continue to be unwilling to subsidize 
the educations of students outside of their self-segregated (by 
race and class) school district boundaries. Even with such a 
court decision (highly unlikely even in the most liberal states), 
parents with means would lobby for lower property taxes or pri-
vate school vouchers. This change would shift suburban school 
districts from a de-facto private school model, where small segre-
gated community boundaries keep out the poor and the non-
white, to an actual private school model, where taxes will subsi-
dize private education or simply be lowered to allow parents to 
buy that education themselves. The well-entrenched freedom to 
direct a child's educationws will ensure that the Court would not 
prevent this migration from occurring. Moreover, marginal mi-
nority communities do not possess the political or economic capi-
tal to fight against these outcomes. 
The failure of liberal scholars to understand how tightly cir-
cumscribed minority political power is prevents them from con-
sidering the likely possibility that affirmative action-meager 
and problematic as it is-is all that the polity can implement. 
Once scholars acknowledge this possibility, the notion that the 
rationale for affirmative action should satisfy the preferences of 
academia diminishes. Instead, the way in which a rationale for 
affirmative action interacts with the political sphere, where mi-
norities are embattled, becomes paramount. 
With this change in criteria, nearly all the philosophical 
criticisms that liberal scholars wield against the diversity ration-
ale become virtues. In particular, diversity's conceptual flexibil-
ity, the fact that it can mean nearly anything and be inclusive of 
an infinite array of characteristics, is a terrific asset in the politi-
cal arena; if everyone is "diverse" in one way or another, prefer-
ences are less threatening. For her part, Justice O'Connor uses 
this flexibility with great skill in Grutter. But before we delve 
into a close analysis of diversity's myriad benefits, it will be use-
ful to uncover the political flaws of grounding affirmative action 
in the preferred liberal rationales, ones that emphasize dark his-
tories or continued discrimination. 
1. The Shortcomings of Historically Anchored 
Mfirmative Action Rationales 
There is a legend at Yale Law School that upon learning of 
Ronald Reagan's re-election in 1984-in a race that was widely 
108 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-33 (1972). 
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regarded a fait accompli-a member of the faculty exclaimed to 
another professor "How could this man be reelected? I don't 
know a single person who voted for him and none of my friends 
knows anyone who voted for him. Do you?" The answer from his 
colleague, of course, was no, he did not know a single person who 
supported Ronald Reagan. Whether or not this story is true (and 
it likely is not), it continues to circulate around the law school, 
serving as a cautionary tale to those who enter Yale's cloistered 
environs: beware that you do not come to believe that the ideas 
and values expounded upon within these walls bear any direct 
relationship to the world outside of them. 
Though Yale is particularly guilty of divorcing theory from 
practice, the legal academy as a whole has become more like 
Yale, not less.109 The failure of liberal scholars to critically assess 
their favored rationales for affirmative action stems directly from 
this inability to appreciate that their values may differ signifi-
cantly from those of the public at large. What is particularly 
troubling about this difficulty is that in law, unlike, say, Philoso-
phy or English, this ivory-tower distance will frequently have a 
negative impact on the quality of legal scholarship because the 
law is not a system of reasoning that the academy actually gov-
erns. The negative impact of this myopia is clearly illustrated by 
scholarship that advocates for an affirmative action rationale 
grounded in a history of racial exclusion or evidence of continued 
discrimination. 
The appeal of affirmative action rationales grounded in a 
history of oppression or continuing discrimination is, unfortu-
nately, limited to the liberal scholars who advocate for them. 
These perspectives have limited persuasive power because liberal 
legal academics are a unique group of people with values and 
epistemologies that differ dramatically from most of the Ameri-
can population, and even most college-educated citizens. Law 
professors generally value rigorous logical thinking, have jobs 
that are, for the most part, guaranteed for life, and are unusually 
self-conscious about the privilege they enjoy. Though academics 
are overwhelmingly white and male, their extreme privilege 
means that they do not share the insecurities that their less ac-
complished brethren have felt in the aftermath of the civil rights 
movement, women's liberation, and the disintegration of the old 
social contract guaranteeing long-term employment and generous 
benefits. 
The deep-seated resentments that have emerged from the 
109 See Richard A. Posner, Madison Lecture: Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1 (1998). 
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transformative "progress" of the past half-century have been ex-
ploited brilliantly by the Republican party since the enactment of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Indeed, President Johnson predicted 
the electoral realignment that would take place over the coming 
decades, commenting to an aide that by signing the act he was 
handing over the South, once a Democratic party stronghold, to 
the Republican party for "a generation."no 
To cultivate the status anxiety that resulted from the emas-
culating social upheavals of the 1960's, Republicans created a 
strategy that Kenneth L. Karst dubs the "social issues 
agenda."1u Republicans appealed to the racist, anti-feminist, 
and, later, anti-gay sentiments of white-male voters by using 
code words to bring these voters into a fold where their damaged 
egos could be mended. The central logic of the Republican strat-
egy is to turn white men into victims of the new liberal estab-
lishment by convincing them that they are victimized by do-
gooders who have threatened their hegemony with feminism, af-
firmative action, and "political correctness." 
Affirmative action is particularly threatening to the status of 
this group of men, especially those among them who are poor or 
working class. More than any other group, these whites bene-
fited from the social norms that used to prohibit women and mi-
norities from competing with them for jobs. Though it is unlikely 
that many members of this group could be sold on affirmative ac-
tion in any form, grounding the program in the victimization of 
underrepresented minorities is particularly galling to them be-
cause they have become accustomed to seeing themselves as vic-
tims of 1960s social transformations, and they conceptualize 
blacks, other minorities, and women as ungrateful or undeserv-
ing beneficiaries of those changes. Creating a public discourse 
about affirmative action based on past or current victimization 
raises this group's ire and gives them the tools to recruit others 
into their coalition. 
Moreover, an affirmative action rationale rooted in minority 
victimization allows the program's white male opponents to re-
cruit others to their cause because that justification runs up 
against other deeply-held and widely-shared American convic-
tions. We can think of these socially constitutive beliefs as an 
110 Johnson is said to have told an aide, shortly after signing the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, that "(w]e have just lost the South for a generation." John W. Lee, III, Class War-
fare 1988-2005 over Top Individual Income Tax Rates: Teeter-Totter from Soak-the-Rich to 
Robin-Hood-in-Reverse, 2 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 47, 125 (2006). 
111 KARST, supra note 26, at 27-28 (arguing that the Republican party has tapped 
into this race animosity quite successfully by using code words that support its social is-
sues agenda). · 
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expanded version of the "American narrative" that I alluded to 
earlier in this article. In this narrative, our history is a parade of 
economic, social and political advancement, and the meritocracy 
is fair and just, because economic outcomes are linked to hard 
work and persistence, not the accident of birth. 
These myths, coupled with our laissez-faire economic system, 
result in a populace that believes that people control their own 
destiniesn2 (fatalism is for the Europeans). F. Scott Fitzgerald's 
famous line, "[t]here are no second acts in American lives,"n3 
may be the most inapposite American popular quotation. Ameri-
cans are highly adept at reinvention; second acts are common-
place, and third, fourth and fifth acts are not unheard of. Ameri-
cans' self-identity and status are malleable; people do not believe 
that they are tethered to their pasts. All these beliefs are held by 
Americans of every race, and every income level, even though 
nearly every notion is contradicted by statistical evidence or a 
frank assessment of our history.n4 
Given, then, the American aversion to history, conviction 
that hard work can will us out of any circumstance, and pen-
chant for self-reinvention, it is unlikely that a wealth-transfer 
policy directed on the basis of race, emphasizing a terrible history 
of slavery and discrimination, will gain traction in the court of 
public opinion; it is un-American to dwell on the negative, ugly 
past. Such an argument, enshrined in a political opinion, would 
lead to the kind of unproductive political conflict engendered by 
Bowers and Roe. 
2. The Difficulty with the Continuing Discrimination 
Rationale 
The other liberal suggestion, that the Court ground affirma-
tive action in social science research illustrating how conscious 
and unconscious discrimination continue to adversely affect un-
derrepresented minorities, is also wrongheaded. In essence, 
adopting such a rationale requires the Court to publicly accuse 
most Americans of being racist. A discourse framed by such an 
accusation will be even more inflammatory than one framed by a 
history of discrimination because there are now strong social 
norms against overt racism. Accusing people of being racist is a 
112 See Schuck, supra note 61, at 30 (reflecting the view of some affirmative action 
opponents who acknowledge a history of racial deprivation, but who believe that in recent 
years blacks have made "stunning political, economic, and social advances" that suggest 
that "special preferences are no longer warranted"). 
113 F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE LAST TYCOON 163 (Edmund Wilson ed., 1941). 
114 See Class Matters: A Special Section, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/indexes/2005/05/15/nationallclass/ (supporting the conclusion 
that Americans misapprehend the extent of American socio-economic mobility). 
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prescription for contentiousness because people refuse to believe 
that they harbor racial bias. Even in cases where people do ad-
mit to holding racial stereotypes, they do not conceptualize them 
as stereotypes; they believe them to be true. In this way, dis-
crimination is invisible to the majority that perpetrates it. 
Ironically, this denial of bias is growing stronger just as evi-
dence of bias has grown more concrete. Mahzarin Banaji, a psy-
chology professor at Harvard, has conducted path-breaking work 
that proves how deep-seated and wide ranging our unconscious 
biases are.n5 According to her studies, Americans hold strong 
negative biases against racial minorities, the elderly, and social 
groups to which they do not belong.ll6 Despite the strength of 
her research and the persuasiveness of her analysis, however, 
Professor Banaji's own Harvard undergraduates refuse to believe 
that they themselves actually harbor these biases,117 Professor 
Banaji's students do not doubt her research, of course. On the 
contrary, most of them believe that America is rife with racism; 
they just do not believe themselves to be racist.na Indeed, ac-
cording to Professor Banaji, her students become quite defensive 
when she confronts them about their results on her bias tests. If 
the most privileged and intelligent undergraduates in the world 
are touchy about confronting their own unconscious bias, it is 
highly probable that the public at large will be even more unwill-
ing to accept that their way of perceiving the world is biased in 
important ways. 
Another recent study also uncovered significant bias against 
job applicants with ''black" first names. In "Are Emily and Greg 
More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal?"119 co-authors 
Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan found that Emily 
and Greg enjoyed a sizable advantage over their counterparts 
with traditionally African-American names. Bertrand and Mul-
lainathan sent out nearly five thousand resumes in response to 
help wanted ads in the Boston Globe and the Chicago Tribune. 
The resumes were equalized for qualifications, though no resume 
sent to the same employer was identical; the most significant dif-
ference between the resumes was whether the applicants names 
115 See Mahzarin Banaji, Ordinary Prejudice, PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE AGENDA, 
Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 8, available at www.apa.org/science/psa/janOl.pdf. 
116 Id. at 9; see also Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 
1513-14 (2005) (discussing and cataloging implicit bias studies by Banaji and others). 
117 Banaji, supra note 115, at 8. 
118 Id. 
119 :\l[arianne Bertrand & Sendhil _:1/[ullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employ-
able than Lakisha and Jamal? l, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
9873, 2004), available at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/mullainathanlpapers/ 
emilygreg.pdf, (showing that similarly qualified black candidates are disfavored even 
when their educational qualifications are significantly superior to white candidates). 
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were typically "white" or "bhwk." 
The authors found that "white" applicants were 50% more 
likely to receive a request for an interview than "black" appli-
cants with equivalent qualifications.12o More distressingly, while 
white applicants with higher quality resumes received 30% more 
callbacks as a result of their qualifications, black applicants gar-
nered a smaller gain for the same increase in qualifications.121 
Put succinctly, according to the authors, "the gap between White 
and African-Americans widens with resume quality."122 Again, 
despite strong social norms that discourage discrimination on the 
basis of race, the authors of this study found evidence of perva-
sive racism, even without direct visual stimulus. All these bi-
ases, however, are likely invisible to those who hold them. 
This invisibility is doubly pernicious. First, it weakens the 
resolve to implement affirmative action programs because most 
people will not believe that race discrimination still exists when 
they do not see for themselves the evidence of overt discrimina-
tion. Second, the weakened resolve to implement affirmative ac-
tion works to consolidate the existing racial order, further en-
trenching the invisible biases that created these racial disparities 
in the first place. Under these conditions, an affirmative action 
program anchored in history or evidence of continuing discrimi-
nation is destined to faiL 
To further complicate matters, a backward-looking rationale 
or one based on evidence of continuing discrimination invites 
empirical scrutiny by structuring affirmative action in a way that 
encourages people to think of the program as a means of repay-
ing the debt owed by whites to disadvantaged minorities. This 
"debt" frame is explicitly favored by Professor Forde-Mazrui, and 
implicitly favored by other liberal scholars who approve of af-
firmative action and disapprove of the diversity rationale. These 
scholars favor this structure because it is familiar: every lawyer 
thinks of equity in terms of tort law. Attorneys are trained to 
ask: "How can we make the plaintiff whole? By what amount has 
the plaintiff been harmed?" 
The problem with applying this formulation to affirmative 
action in higher education is that the public process of calculat-
ing the individual "damages" that each person deserves would 
quantify people in a way that most Americans would consider 
grotesque.12s Even assuming that such individualized considera-
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 3. 
122 Id. 
123 See Peter Skerry, The Strange Politics of Affirmative Action, THE WILSON 
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tion were possible, the calculations involved are daunting and 
uncomfortable. One would need to quantify the amount of bias 
that every individual minority actually encounters in order to 
discern the size of the societal debt that needs to be repaid. Such 
a calculus raises countless questions: Does society owe a debt to 
Puerto Ricans and Mexicans (for de facto colonialism), but not to 
certain first generation Cuban-Americans, who are relatively 
well off? Do Latinos without accents and more "European" fea-
tures get less preference than mestizos and other Latinos with 
more "indigenous" features? What about Latinos without a 
Spanish surname? Do dark-skinned blacks inspire more racial 
animus than light-skinned blacks? 
The empirical resolution of such questions may make for an 
interesting econometric exercise, but it is too complex and ra-
cially essentializing to be politically viable. These are discus-
sions that the judiciary cannot have. Minorities would not want 
to be subjected to such an analysis, or they would bicker about 
the values assigned to different characteristics, and whites, who 
mostly do not believe that racism exists, would object to paying 
off the "debt" in such a complex way. Again, from the American 
perspective, complexity may be a sign of fraudulence. Put sim-
ply, quantifying harm in this way runs against the American 
preference for self-definition. Americans want to present their 
personal stories on their own terms; no one wants to be just an-
other number. Justice O'Connor sensed the importance of this 
value.l24 This difference alone explains why she voted to over-
turn the Michigan undergraduate program, which used an explic-
itly numerical approach to admissions, and upheld the law 
school's "whole student" approach in Grutter. It is unimportant 
whether the different approaches produced differences in fact, 
Grutter properly locates some metaphysical procedural value in 
the holistic, non-numerical approach practiced at the law school. 
This analysis of the pitfalls of more "academic" rationales for 
affirmative action also illustrates why the judicial rationale for 
affirmative action is so important. Affirmative action is being 
asked to do what is nearly impossible. It must seek to solve a 
problem that no one, excepting those who lack political and eco-
nomic power, as well as a few elites, believes to exist. Plainly, 
under these conditions, a politically persuasive affirmative action 
policy cannot be constructed by assembling past and present so-
cial science data to make an empirical case for compensation and 
redistribution. On the contrary, the rationale that validates af-
QUARTERLY, Winter 1997, at 39, 40, available at http://www.brookings.edu/gs/ 
Skerry _aa.pdf. 
124 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003). 
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firmative action needs to be constructed around the viewpoint of 
the majority. By implementing the program without an explicitly 
empirical focus, the program can survive by staying off the politi-
cal balance sheet, where scrutiny of the policy's intricacies could 
lead to its abolition. The Court should embrace diversity pre-
cisely because that rationale is silent on the deeper contradic-
tions and difficulties surrounding a subject-race-that is taboo. 
3. The Grutter Dissent and the Problem with Numerical 
Emphasis 
The Grutter dissent illustrates the problems with a rhetoric 
that encourages a numerical approach towards affirmative ac-
tion, taking as their starting point a deconstruction of the Uni-
versity of Michigan law school's stated interest in attaining a 
critical mass of minority students. "[C]ritical mass," the dissent 
claims, is a "veil" that obscures the law school's attempt at "na-
ked ... racial balancing."125 In particular, a close look at the law 
school's numbers leads the dissenters to conclude that black ap-
plicants are favored over Latinos with higher qualifications. The 
implication of this finding, from the dissenter's point of view, is 
that a program that discriminates between underrepresented mi-
norities must be pernicious. 
In fact, however, the law school admissions committee's 
"balancing'' may reflect real differentials between the black and 
Latino racial experience, precisely the kinds of differences that a 
hyper-accurate, empirical affirmative action would seek to quan-
tify. There is sociological evidence that blacks may suffer signifi-
cantly more racial discrimination in American society than Lati-
nos do.12s For example, there are probably more Latinos than 
blacks that can pass for white, African-Americans have a history 
of slavery that most Latinos lack, and white-Latina intermar-
riage rates are significantly higher than black-white intermar-
riage rates, and still climbing.121 
Yet, as the dissent shows, most Americans would probably be 
uncomfortable with a public discussion of why some minorities 
might deserve more preference than others. Supreme Court 
precedent reflects this discomfort by prohibiting "racial balanc-
ing."128 If Justice O'Connor had actually adopted a historical or 
125 Id. at 379 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
126 See Delgado, supra note 106, at 497-98 nn.48--49. 
127 Approximately 30% of marriages involving U.S.-born Latinos are inter-Hispanic, 
while only 7% of blacks marry a spouse of another race. Sharon M. Lee & Barry Edmon-
ston, New Marriages, New Families: U.S. Racial and Hispanic Intermarriage, 60 POPU· 
LATION BULLETIN, June 2005, at 3, 12, 27, available at http://www.prb.org/pdf05/ 
60.2NewMarriages.pdf. 
128 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. 
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ongoing discrimination rationale in Grutter, she would have had 
to engage in this debate about differential preferences in the ma-
jority decision. Imagine the formal challenges of writing a major-
ity decision that rationalized every inter-racial choice that the 
law school makes through a complex social-scientific exegesis, 
like the one presented above. Such discussions might satisfy lib-
eral elites who are comfortable seeing the world in shades of 
gray, but to the black-white public, these complex explanations 
would do much to discredit the program and encourage a political 
movement to prohibit it. 
More troubling still, public discussions of differential prefer-
ences might serve to divide racial minorities among themselves. 
Encouraging interracial strife of this sort damages minority in-
terests as a whole because racial minorities can only have signifi-
cant power by asserting a unified front. The Grutter dissent pre-
sents its finding in a way that suggests that Latinos should lobby 
for the spots that blacks "took away" from them or join whites in 
opposing the program. The dissent fails to emphasize that while 
Latinos may not receive quite the boost that Mrican-Americans 
do, Latinos still receive preference relative to many white candi-
dates. Thus, even if Latinos receive less preference, they are bet-
ter off working with blacks to keep affirmative action than they 
would be were they to join with whites in seeking to abolish the 
program. 
Blacks in particular fear this emphasis on difference because 
they have seen potential allies back down before. Whites have a 
long history of giving other disfavored groups subtle preferences 
and the promise of future entry into the white race in exchange 
for that group's refusal to align its interests with blacks.129 Dur-
ing the colonial period, slave masters gave certain privileges to 
their white indentured servants to keep them from uniting with 
blacks against the landowners (this is, unsurprisingly, a favorite 
example among Marxists).130 Nobel Laureate Toni Morrison ex-
pressed this history of differentiation in this way: 
If there were no black people here in this country, it would have 
been Balkanized. The immigrants would have torn each other's 
throats out, as they have done everywhere else. But in becoming an 
American, from Europe, what one has in common with that other im-
migrant is contempt for me-it's nothing else but color. Wherever 
they were from, they would stand together. They could all say, "I am 
not that." So in that sense, becoming an American is based on an atti-
129 See, e.g., WILLIAM J. GARDINER, REFLECTIONS ON THE HISTORY OF WHITE 
SUPREMACY 7-9 (Apr. 28, 2003), http://www.uua.org/programs/justice/antiracism/ 
Greenfiled%20Group%20Paper.pdf. 
130 Id. 
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tude: an exclusion of me.131 
When highly numerical analytic models are applied to race, 
they will always highlight the significant differences between the 
racial experiences of distinct minority groups, because such dif-
ferences do exist. But because the temptation to assimilate into 
the system by aligning one's interests with the majority is so 
strong (see, e.g., Jews, Irish, Polish, ad infinitum), emphasizing 
differences between minority groups obscures their shared ex-
periences, preventing them from joining together. Inter-racial 
solidarity, in short, presents a classic problem of collective action. 
Minorities must join together in order to create a public good, 
and through it all members can gain advantage. But members 
who can pass in certain contexts for the majority race can opt out 
of contributing to the common pool and thereby undermine the 
strength of the coalition. Thankfully, it seems as if blacks and 
Latinos are learning to forge common alliances (see, e.g., the re-
cent Los Angeles mayoral race);I32 but these will always be tenu-
ous if discourse is structured in a way that magnifies the differ-
ences between the black and Latino racial experience. 
Lastly, and most importantly for racial minorities, the his-
torical or current bias rationale perpetuates a conception of mi-
norities as damaged, flawed, and deficient. As one scholar put it: 
[A] common theme of the last fifty years (but with roots in the writ-
ings of W.E.B. DuBois at the turn of the century) has been the effort 
by racial liberals to construct Mrican Americans as damaged and to 
use that "damage imagery" to build support for progressive racial poli-
cies. The arguments in favor of school desegregation in Brown v. 
Board of Education and affirmative action in the mid-1960s, for ex-
ample, were premised in part on the notion that Mrican Americans 
had been damaged by racial discrimination and segregation.133 
While such a conception provides substantial philosophical 
justification for affirmative action, that rhetoric does harm to the 
minorities it is designed to help. The concept of diversity, on the 
other hand, transfigures this damage into a positive characteris-
tic, a battle-scar to take pride in; it is something that grants its 
victims a special kind of knowledge. 
In sum, the pet rationales of liberal scholars do harm to mi-
nority interests by inviting a quantitative inquiry, framing the 
131 Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby-LatCrit 
Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1602 n.59 (1997). 
132 Brian MacQuarrie, Black-Latino Alliance Buoys L.A. Mayor Candidate, THE 
BOSTON GLOBE, May 4, 2005, at Al. 
133 Davison M. Douglas, Justifying Racial Reform, 16 TEX. L. REV. 1163, 1164 (1998) 
(reviewing DARYL MICHAEL SCOTT, COJ\i"TEMPT AND PITY: SOCIAL POLICY AND THE !:MAGE 
OF THE DAMAGED BLACK PSYCHE, 1880-1996 (1997)) (citations omitted). 
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program in terms of debt, and perpetuating a damaged image of 
minority populations. That said, these rationales are philosophi-
cally and formally much more satisfying justifications for af-
firmative action. Where the Supreme Court is called upon to pro-
tect minority interests, however, their role will necessarily be 
more political than formally legal. By embracing a rhetoric that 
seeks to persuade the political majority, Justice O'Connor best 
serves the interests of racial minorities. Justice O'Connor's 
adoption of diversity, and even her decision to reject the under-
graduate program's numerical emphasis in Gratz, were designed 
to appeal to this constituency. A Court that insisted on legal 
formalism without a thought to politics would fail in its role to 
defend and further minority political gains. 
IV. HOW GRUTTER'S APPLICATION OF THE DIVERSITY RATIONALE 
DEFENDS MINORITY INTERESTS 
With the importance of the public audience in mind, we now 
turn to Justice O'Connor's opinion in Grutter. Much has been 
made of O'Connor's tendency to look at adjudication from a legis-
lator's perspective. In practice, this point of view has led 
O'Connor to fashion an ad hoc, pragmatic jurisprudence. This 
pragmatism, and her notorious penchant for balancing tests, 134 is 
frequently a source of scorn within the academy. I will leave for 
another day a discussion of whether or not such criticisms are 
warranted. For our purposes, however, this explicitly political 
point of view is the ideal perspective to bring to writing an opin-
ion that vindicates affirmative action. 
Indeed, Justice O'Connor's political radar is so finely tuned 
that she can detect the needs, insecurities and values of the "pub-
lic," and fashion her opinion accordingly.135 Furthermore, 
O'Connor undoubtedly knows that it is not really the "public" 
that shapes its own constitutional discourse (if constitutional 
scholars barely read any Supreme Court decisions, it is hardly 
possible that the citizenry does). Public discussion is framed, in-
stead, by journalists and other members of the media elite. The 
Grutter decision is perfectly pitched to this constituency; it ap-
pears, like the best of plays, to be self-consciously designed to 
evoke particular responses in a particular audience. Once we 
understand that this is O'Connor's intent in Grutter, we can ap-
134 Richard Brust, Balancing Act: Her Constitutional Tests and Strategic Concur-
rences Helped Make Sandra Day O'Connor a Force from the Center, ABA JOURNAL, Sept. 
2005, at 34, available at http://www.abanet.org/journallredesign/09fscase.html. 
135 For purposes of this analysis I will operate under the fiction that we can actually 
determine O'Connor's intentions from the text and the context in which they were made. 
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preciate how skillfully she works to manipulate the public dis-
course. 
A From Decision to Narrative 
The Law and Literature movement has sought to wring in-
sight from the observation that lawyers are like novelists because 
both construct reality by telling stories through language. 
Though the movement has not sought to compare lawyers and 
reporters, journalists are also storytellers, spinning verifiable 
facts into yarns that appeal to their particular readerships. 
Moreover, unlike novelists, journalists have more than a passing 
relationship with the law; reporters translate the law into stories 
that their readership can digest. 
This more general audience means that when journalists in-
terpret Supreme Court decisions, they ask different questions 
than lawyers do. Journalists do not wonder: "Is the decision logi-
cally consistent? How will it be received by the lower courts? 
Does it violate accepted constitutional theory?" Instead, journal-
ists ask what stories the decision tells. Their editors ask, "What 
is my headline? How do I get the attention of my distractible 
readership?" With this knowledge of how legal decisions of public 
importance are consumed, O'Connor has deliberately crafted 
Grutter in a way that tells some stories and buries others. The 
stories she chooses to tell serve to empower minorities and as-
suage the egos of the majority. But as with any writer, the sto-
ries that O'Connor chooses not to tell are as important as the 
ones she does. To put it more esoterically, Grutter displays a 
mastery of what Sunstein dubs the constructive use of silence.l36 
What is most ingenious about Justice O'Connor's Grutter 
opinion is the way in which it uses the definitional capaciousness 
of the diversity rationale, or, if you prefer, the instability of its 
meaning, to facilitate her narrative project. Diversity allows 
O'Connor to take all the best arguments for affirmative action, 
each one logically distinct, and place each under the "diversity" 
heading. This everything-but-the-kitchen sink approach works 
because, ultimately, affirmative action's justification comes from 
a variety of analyses and rationales. When considered individu-
ally, the "pros" of any one rationale barely outweigh the "cons." 
The sum, however, of these diverse rationales makes an effective 
case for the program. 
This kind of summation is unwieldy, though. If fully articu-
lated in a legal opinion it would distract substantially from the 
136 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 34, at 39. 
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opinion's central holding. With diversity as Grutter's primary or-
ganizing principle, however, O'Connor was able to argue, without 
apparent inconsistency, that diversity has positive educational 
value, allows the American military to defend our interests, pro-
vides the citizenry with a representative cross-section of leaders 
in disparate fields, aids in the formation of good citizens, and 
that diversity is necessary "[b]y virtue of our Nation's struggle 
with racial inequality."l37 
B. Diversity as Anti-Story 
Ironically, by adopting diversity, the subject of so much 
hand-wringing in the academy, Justice O'Connor avoided making 
Grutter's rationale the primary subject of public discussion about 
the decision. Why? Because diversity is old news, so to speak. 
O'Connor's reaffirmation of a prevailing rationale did not make 
for an interesting story. 
In advance of the decision, there was speculation (hope in 
some corners) that the Court would use Grutter to change course 
and ground affirmative action in a new rationale. These alterna-
tive rationales, had the Court adopted them, would have made 
for excellent news. Imagine the headlines had Grutter endorsed 
affirmative action as a remedy for continuing societal discrimina-
tion: "Racists Every One: The High Court Calls Affirmative Ac-
tion a Necessity in Racist Nation"; "New Analysis: Are We Rac-
ists Without Even Knowing it?"; "Affirmative Action: the Price 
We Pay for Continued Racism." Historical remediation would 
also fare poorly: "Past Sins Still Cost, High Court Says"; "Blacks 
to Whites: Pay Up with Affirmative Action (It's Better than 
Reparations)." Needless to say, discussions framed in this way 
would not further minority interests. 
C. Narrative 1: Whites Benefit from Affirmative Action and 
They Can Become Diverse, Too 
In its substantive ruling (affirming the use of race-based 
preferences), Grutter unavoidably reinforces the Republican nar-
rative of white victimization. The structure of affirmative action 
requires that some group pay the cost, and those who pay may 
easily consider themselves victimized. O'Connor's opinion, how-
ever, is designed to minimize this narrative by omitting an ex-
plicit elaboration of this story and by emphasizing a distracting 
counter-narrative that illustrates the many ways in which diver-
sity encompasses experiences and histories that the majority 
possesses. 
137 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 338 (2003). 
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Like all impact litigation plaintiffs, Barbara Grutter was 
chosen to be the face of the crusade because she has characteris-
tics that make her a sympathetic victim. First, Ms. Grutter is a 
woman. A female plaintiff is appealing both because prevailing 
societal stereotypes view females as commonly victimized and be-
cause women were once affirmative action's primary beneficiar-
ies, and in some work contexts still are. 
Second, Grutter did well in college, she graduated with a 
relatively high GPA, but did less well on the LSAT.l38 Today her 
GPA would place her in the top 25% of Michigan's law school's 
admittees, while her LSAT score would place her in the bottom 
25%.139 These numbers suggest that Grutter had a plausible 
chance of being admitted to the University of Michigan Law 
School, but they also contain a subtle subtext. Her high grades 
signal diligence and effort, while her low LSAT score grants her a 
humanizing failing. 
Finally, Grutter does not fit the profile of the typical Univer-
sity of Michigan student. She is a mother and businesswoman, 
and when she applied in 1997 she was forty-three years old.140 
These characteristics are the most troublesome for the diversity 
rationale. In an interview conducted before the Court granted 
certiorari, Grutter herself described her denial of admission in a 
way that creates a rhetorical rift between race and diversity: "It 
was not a diversity issue, it was a race issue," she said.l41 
Aware of these concerns, O'Connor minimizes Barbara Grut-
ter's sympathetic characteristics by effacing her from the opinion 
as much as possible. Of course, O'Connor could not leave Grutter 
out of the opinion entirely because judicial conventions require a 
factual recitation and summary of the procedural posture, and in 
this case, the plaintiffs personal characteristics were plainly im-
portant to the ultimate disposition. Even so, O'Connor uses the 
convention to radically dehumanize Grutter. Where news stories 
preceding the resolution of the case emphasized Grutter's unique 
personal characteristics, O'Connor's description of the plaintiff 
renders her characterless. In Justice O'Connor's narrative, Bar-
bara Grutter, mother and businesswoman, becomes "a white 
Michigan resident who applied to the Law School in 1996 with a 
138 Id. at 316. 
139 See LSAC, Official Guide to ABA-Approved Law Schools, Profile of the University 
of Michigan Law School, http://officialguide.lsac.org/OFFGUIDE/pdf/aba1839.pdf. 
140 Anne Gearan, Rejected "White Law School Applicant Appeals Reverse Discrimina-
tion Case to Supreme Court, The AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND DIVERSITY PROJECT, Aug. 9, 
2002, http://aad.english. ucsb.edu/docs/gearan.html; see Bill Mears, Supreme Court Hears 
Affirmative Action Arguments, CNN.COM, Apr. 1, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/ 
03/31/scotus.affirmative.action.advance/. 
141 Gearan, supra note 140. 
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3.8 GPA and 161 LSAT score."I42 Mter this cursory description 
Grutter is further reduced. Her name never again appears in the 
opinion; she is afterward referred to only as "petitioner." 
This kind of radical reduction, of course, is a staple of legal 
reasoning. Legal opinions always seek to minimize damaging 
facts and emphasize favorable ones. O'Connor's description of 
Grutter is only notable because the rest of her opinion goes to 
such pains to validate the importance of humanizing applicants 
by thorough non-empirical consideration. Plainly, O'Connor was 
concerned that Grutter might become the story; she would surely 
be interviewed after the Court rendered its decision, just as she 
was before oral argument. There was no need, then, for the 
Court to further emphasize Grutter's narrative, especially when 
it would conflict so obviously with the story that O'Connor was 
trying to tell. 
That story, of diversity's inclusiveness, occupies a primary 
place in the opinion, directly preceding the declaration of a 
twenty-five year "time limit" on the program, O'Connor's other 
strategic concession to the sentiments of whites.I43 By emphasiz-
ing the preference that the law school confers on students who 
have traveled widely, who speak foreign languages, who have 
overcome personal adversity or family hardships, or who have 
pursued careers in other fields,I44 O'Connor shows how diversity 
includes experiences and accomplishments that happen to, or can 
be achieved by, all Americans. Further, by analogizing race to 
other experiences that whites commonly find "enriching," the 
benefits of minority perspectives in the academy is made less ab-
stract to those who do not see life through a racial lens. In 
O'Connor's narrative, then, racial knowledge becomes a sub-
category of universal, attainable life experience, rather than a 
separate, exclusive, and unattainable characteristic.I45 
This expansive definition of merit is implicitly contrasted 
with the much less desirable alternative of an admissions regime 
that considered only an applicant's LSAT score and GPA, or, like 
the undergraduate program, one that converted "soft" character-
istics into numerical values. In either of the latter two scenarios, 
applicants are just numbers. Few Americans of any color would 
prefer to go before an admissions committee as a numerical 
summation rather than as "whole" person. 
142 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316. 
143 See infra notes 146-150 and accompanying text. 
144 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338. 
145 This frame is in marked contrast to nearlv all anti-discrimination laws which em-
phasize the immutability of race as a basis f~r gr;nting judicial and legislative protection. 
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These effects are subtle, and their main purpose is simply to 
create a storyline that deflects attention from narratives that 
might emphasize affirmative action's inherent contradictions. 
Should the journalist or lay reader fail to appreciate these subtle-
ties, however, O'Connor made sure to cap her ruling with a guar-
anteed headline generator, a few paragraphs of dicta that were 
transubstantiated by reporters into a twenty-five year time 
limit.I46 
D. Narrative 2: Affirmative Action Will End 
Time limits are dangerous terrain for the judiciary; indeed, 
courts have a general aversion to numbers in any context. But 
Americans like time limits because they provide a sense of clo-
sure by marking a point where things will change. O'Connor is 
careful to structure her affirmative action "time limit'' so as to 
generate headlines, while making it apparent to a legal audience 
that the limit is not formally binding. 
She pulls off this sleight of hand by devoting a few para-
graphs to a discussion of case law that articulates why "race-
conscious admissions policies must be limited in time,"I47 creat-
ing the impression that she will follow this precedent and declare 
a time limit for affirmative action in higher education. In a nod 
to her public audience, O'Connor emphasizes that time limits are 
important because they "assureD all citizens that the deviation 
from the norm of equal treatment ... is a temporary matter."I48 
Mter all this bluster, though, she promulgates a rather 
toothless limit, stating only that "[w]e [the majority] expect that 
25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be 
necessary to further the interest approved today."l49 Plainly, this 
tepid language will not cause Grutter to self-destruct twenty-five 
years from now,l50 though it will force a future court to be less 
deferential to universities still granting racial preferences after 
the lapse of the "limit." Even so, there is nothing in the decision 
that precludes the Court from granting an extension for the prac-
tice if hoped-for gains fail to materialize. To most journalists, 
however, these legal distinctions will be lost in the race to create 
attention-grabbing headlines.l51 
146 See, e.g., Daniel Mark Fogel, Expiration Date Is Set, CHI. TRIB., July 20, 2003, § 2, 
at 1. 
147 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342. 
148 Id. (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, at 510 (1989) (plurality 
opinion)). 
149 Id. at 343. 
150 Surprisingly, Justice Thomas appears to believe that the twenty-five year "time 
limit" represents an actual holding. Id. at 375-76 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
151 E.g., Fogel, supra note 146. 
l 
2006] A Matter of Rhetoric 231 
In keeping with the rest of O'Connor's opinion, the time limit 
also serves to empower minorities by suggesting a point at which 
preferences will be unnecessary, willing by judicial fiat a move-
ment towards equal treatment. Though the deadline is non-
binding, O'Connor has created a public expectation that affirma-
tive action, in this context, will end. This expectation means that 
it will be politically difficult to grant such an extension, even 
though it is formally possible. The time limit's substantive effect, 
then, is to make minority underperformance much more press-
ing, while allowing for an extension of affirmative action in the 
case that improvements in poorer school districts fail to material-
Ize. 
Plainly, this opinion will not catalyze wholesale change in 
the status of inner-city public schools, but universities are power-
ful institutions that may now take more aggressive steps to im-
prove the educational pipeline that brings students to their cam-
puses. 
In this way, O'Connor has constructed a narrative for con-
sumption by a public audience that seeks to assuage negative 
sentiment among whites while changing the role of minorities 
from beneficiaries to patrons. In this tale, it is all students, espe-
cially whites, who benefit from the educational enhancements of 
affirmative action. 
E. Narrative 3: Minorities Undamaged 
There are reasons for underrepresented minorities to like 
Justice O'Connor's opinion, other than for its central holding. 
Most prominently, the diversity rationale "un-damages" minori-
ties by converting race from a stigma into a category of knowl-
edge. O'Connor also manages to elegantly collapse the distinc-
tion that the dissenters seek to enact between diversity and 
merit: 
With respect to the use of race itself, all underrepresented minority 
students admitted by the Law School have been deemed qualified. By 
virtue of our Nation's struggle with racial inequality, such students 
are both likely to have experiences of particular importance to the 
Law School's mission, and less likely to be admitted in meaningful 
numbers on criteria that ignore those experiences.152 
What is so brilliant about this particular passage is the 
economy with which it accomplishes three discrete tasks. It 
manages to place underrepresented minorities on the same level 
as their white counterparts, stating that all minority students 
have ''been deemed qualified." Then, in the next breath, it subtly 
152 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337-38. 
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acknowledges how past and present racial discrimination both 
account for underrepresented minorities' racial knowledge and 
mandate the need for preference. Thus, effectively, O'Connor in-
corporates the favored rationales of liberal elites-past and pre-
sent discrimination-into her opinion, but by wrapping them in 
diversity's comfortable, non-accusatory embrace, she dampens 
the sting that they would carry in their full elaboration. 
Better still for the status interests of underrepresented mi-
norities, Grutter focused attention on the crucial role that these 
groups play in the American armed services.I53 O'Connor was 
only able to highlight the contents of an amicus brief submitted 
by retired military officers because of the flexibility of her 
kitchen-sink diversity approach. Under a more traditional struc-
ture, this argument could not be accommodated because it is in-
consistent with an emphasis on past or present discrimination. 
These former officers believe that having an officer corps that 
mirrors the composition of enlisted men and women is imperative 
for our national security, or, as one commentator put it, a racially 
integrated officer corps may be "mission critical."r54 
This is another line of argument that does double duty. It 
recasts underrepresented minorities in the role of patriots and 
thereby raises the stakes of the affirmative action debate. By 
linking affirmative action to national security at a time when 
anxiety over security was high, O'Connor knit together the inter-
ests of all Americans. Again, by reading Grutter as a text aimed 
at a public audience, we can appreciate how O'Connor is crafting 
a narrative that affirms and validates the status of underrepre-
sented minorities, while methodically convincing whites that af-
firmative action is in their interest and even in the best interests 
of the country. 
To her credit, O'Connor's political instincts were spot on. 
The adoption of the arguments put forth in the military brief 
garnered significant press coverage, with many media outlets 
speculating that that brief swung the Court's discussionJ55 
F. Narrative 4: Universities Deserve Special Deference 
The other prominent story that Grutter tells is one that ele-
vates the civic role of universities in order to justify the excep-
tional legal deference that O'Connor grants them in her opin-
153 Id. at 331. 
154 See Bryan W. Leach, Race as Mission Critical: The Occupational Need Rationale 
in Military Affirmative Action and Beyond, 113 YALE L.J. 1093, 1094 (2004). 
155 See LEVINSON, supra note 13, at 56-58. 
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ion.156 This deference was particularly important for O'Connor to 
articulate because she wanted to avoid undertaking a detailed 
statistical inquiry in the text of her opinion. Such an inquiry 
would have told a story she did not want to tell. 
Many critics believe that this deference, as well as 
O'Connor's refusal to address the "racial balancing'' accusations 
lobbed in the dissent, eviscerate the meaning of strict scrutiny.l57 
This group argues that O'Connor simply failed to apply the stan-
dard that she said that she was applying. In reality, O'Connor 
applied the standard, but did not make her analysis public, be-
cause the story of that strict-scrutiny application is not some-
thing that furthers the substantive interests of minorities. 
After all, protecting that interest was her main concern. The 
strict-scrutiny test was designed to "smoke out" policies that hurt 
minorities;l58 there is no reason, then, that O'Connor should be 
forced into a public discussion of that inquiry if that discussion 
would actually hurt her main constituency in the political realm. 
Diversity, then, is more than just a "fig leaf' for affirmative 
action. The rationale represents a self-conscious judicial choice 
to present affirmative action in a way that will advance and pro-
tect minority rights in a political system that systematically de-
nies underrepresented minorities the ability to lobby for more 
substantive change. 
CONCLUSION: THE REAL PROBLEM WITH THE DIVERSITY 
RATIONALE AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
For those who aspire to the truest form of racial equality, one 
that would overthrow the master narrative of white dominance, 
my defense of affirmative action will ring hollow. In essence, I 
am advocating the adoption of the diversity rationale as a way to 
appease a white constituency that, from a neutral standpoint, 
has no right to be appeased. The ultimate story of affirmative ac-
tion, then, is the story of every liberal reform of a fundamentally 
unequal system. Derrick Bell told this story nearly twenty-five 
years ago: 
First, blacks are more likely to obtain relief for even acknowledged ra· 
cial injustice when that relief also serves, directly or indirectly, to fur· 
ther ends which policymakers perceive are in the best interests of the 
country. Second, blacks as well as their white allies, are likely to fo-
cus with gratitude on the relief obtained, usually after a long struggle. 
!56 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. 
157 See Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Grutter and Gratz: A Critical Analysis, 41 Hous. L. 
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Little attention is paid to the self-interest factors without which no re-
lief might have been gained. Moreover, the relief is viewed as proof 
that society is indeed just, and that eventually all racial injustices will 
be recognized and remedied. Third, the remedy for blacks appropri-
ately viewed as a "good deal" by policymaking whites often provide 
[sic] benefits for blacks that are more symbolic than substantive; but 
whether substantive or not, they are often perceived by working class 
whites as both an unearned gift to blacks and a betrayal of poor 
whites.159 
For all the work that Justice O'Connor does to mitigate some 
of the most troubling aspects of this narrative, no judicial opinion 
can magically refigure a story that has its roots deep in our coun-
try's troubled history. I doubt that this nation's original sins-
the robbing of virgin territory, the enslavement of a race of peo-
ple, the subjugation of people who lost battle after battle----<:an 
ever truly be overcome; these acts will continue to haunt our na-
tion. 
Still, troubling ghosts can catalyze change, and though 
America remains far from equal, affirmative action in higher 
education is making things incrementally, but significantly, bet-
ter. By ensuring that underrepresented minorities are a signifi-
cant presence on college and university campuses, we are not 
stigmatizing an entire generation, as some critics would have us 
believe. Doubts as to the abilities of minorities would persist 
with or without affirmative action; that is the nature of preju-
dice. But this prejudice would persist unabated if there were 
fewer underrepresented minorities passing through the mani-
cured quadrangles of elite colleges and universities. Mahzarin 
Banaji, the Harvard professor who has shown how unconsciously 
racist human beings are, has suggested that the only way to 
overcome these biases is to develop close personal and profes-
sional relationships with members of those groups that one har-
bors bias against.160 That analysis is the best evidence yet that 
affirmative action, for all the controversy it causes, may be work-
ing to heal this nation and stifle the hauntings of those terrible 
ghosts. 
159 BELL, supra note 57, at 7. 
160 See Kang, supra note 116, at 1593. 
